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CHAPTER 14

NATO STRATEGY AND DISPERSALS
1964 - 1966

(~~SECRET~~) The quixotic problem of NATO nuclear policy again arose in 1963 when the Military Committee (MC) of the NATO Advisory Council (NAC) proposed replacing the NATO strategic doctrine, MC 14/2, with a much broader one which was based on the concept that the previous strategy was both militarily and politically infeasible. The Committee dropped the proposal when it became clear it was not going to be adopted. However, the JCS used it to prepare a position paper on Military Strategy for NATO which Secretary McNamara forwarded to Secretary of State Rusk on December 3, 1963, for his comments. Secretary Rusk responded on February 20, 1964, expressing his strong reservations on the paper and forwarding a State Department analysis, based on the NATO policy approved in April 1961, which attacked the forward nuclear strategy being advocated by the Germans. The State Department paper U. S. Policies for NATO Defense was concerned primarily with conventional defense of Europe. It considered the use of nuclear weapons only in the event that NATO forces were being overwhelmed or if they had been otherwise unable to regain a vital objective. The differences between the two papers were of such magnitude that Mr. McNamara directed the JCS to use MC 100/1 as the basis for their position. In May 1964 Mr. McNamara solicited comments from the State Department on the suitability for presentation to the President of a tabulation of plans for the provision of nuclear support to non-US NATO forces. Mr. Rusk replied on July 28 that State and Defense should conduct an intensive study of the military and political aspects of NATO tactical nuclear warfare in order to develop an agreed general concept to support a recommendation to the President for changes in national policy. In commenting on two areas in Mr. McNamara's letter, he recommended that the build-up in 8-inch Howitzer, Honest John, Nike Hercules and ADM levels be deferred until an overall study had been completed.

(U) By letter on June 19, the Secretary of Defense suggested to Mr. Rusk that MC 100/1 be used as guidance for our military representatives in NATO forums. The Secretary of State agreed that it might be possible for the time being to defer attempts to reach an agreement but questioned the use of MC 100/1 as a suitable guide.

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(U) In October 1964, a Draft Presidential Memorandum, The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy was published which represented Mr. McNamara's personal views and was a compromise between the JCS and State's positions. It presented three nuclear options short of general war; demonstrative use of low yield weapons in a limited sector; a selective use theater wide west of the USSR for less than a few days; and a nuclear battle for less than a period of weeks to render ineffective the enemy's front line and immediate reserve forces. The rationale, among others presented, was that the number of weapons in Europe exceeded our capability to use them; and that future changes in SACEUR nuclear capability should be downward and cautious to avoid upsetting the status quo, increasing the risk or impairing the deterrence.

(S) There were then three differing philosophies on NATO nuclear policy in late 1964. The official national nuclear policy for Europe was stated in NSAM 332 in December 1964 which provided the following guidelines to be used in discussions with NATO on nuclear defense:

1. We must adhere to our policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.
2. The United Kingdom must be led out of the field of strategic deterrence.
3. Reduce the capability of the Germans for separate nuclear action.
4. Promote collective defense.

(U) It was during this time of exchanging of views that the FY 65 dispersal plan came up for coordination. In commenting on the proposed DoD dispersal plan for FY 65, Llewellyn Thompson, the Acting Under Secretary of State, made it clear that State did not concur in the planning figures for support of non-US forces for the same reasons enumerated in Mr. Rusk's letter of July 28, 1964. Mr. Thompson proposed that it would be useful if these areas could be discussed by a special committee composed of Mr. McNaughton from DoD/ISA, General Goodpaster from JCS and himself.

(S) The Thompson Strategy Discussion Group, as it was referred to, met on March 23, 1965, at the State Department, with representatives from Defense, State and the JCS. As a result of the discussions, a tentative agreement was made by State that there was a de facto US commitment to support the non-US NATO nuclear forces which our allies had either acquired or taken positive steps to acquire in fulfillment of MC 26/4 force levels. In turn, Defense tentatively agreed that the FY 65 dispersal plan to be proposed would reflect the strictest possible interpretations

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of MC 26/4.

(S) As a result of these agreements and because of changes in JCS requirements, the FY 65 dispersal plan was revised to cover dispersals through July 1, 1966. The plan proposed support only for those weapons systems currently programmed by the US and the Allies which would be operationally ready and for which storage would be available by June 30, 1966. ADM dispersals would be retained at the authorized FY 64 level until the ADM studies were completed and firm requirements established.

(SFRD) On May 17, 1965, the State Department concurred in the plan but recommended that no additional shipments of ADMs be made to Europe. One week later Mr. McNamara notified Mr. Rusk that as of that date (May 24), he had deferred shipment of any additional ADMs to Europe. He also noted that he expected the results of the ADM study and JCS recommendations by July 1, 1965. Regarding the ceiling on ADMs it appears that the shipments were not as easily stopped as Mr. McNamara obviously thought. The momentum of shipments already in progress was not halted until five weeks later when the number of ADMs in Europe was established at [REDACTED] weapons. A modest increase of [REDACTED] weapons over this ceiling was permitted in the FY 67/68 dispersal plan, thus arriving at the established figure of [REDACTED] ADMs authorized for dispersal in NATO Europe. Meanwhile, the request for nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 1965/1966 was sent to the President on May 24 since both State and AEC had concurred in the proposed plan.

(TSFRD) The FY 65/66 dispersal plan was approved by NSAM 334 on June 1, 1965. It provided for a total of [REDACTED] nuclear elements (out of a total stockpile of [REDACTED] to be transferred from AEC to Defense by June 30, 1966. The JCS reserve would consist of [REDACTED] weapons of which [REDACTED] would be retained under AEC control and [REDACTED] under DoD control. A total of [REDACTED] weapons could be dispersed outside the US in numbers as follows:

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TABLE X

AREAS UNDER FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY, FY 1965

NATO

PACIFIC

ATLANTIC

[REDACTED]
UK
West Germany
Subtotal
[REDACTED]
TOTAL

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

*Contingency for wartime operations only.

This was with the provisos that:

1. The total in each area may be exceeded by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies.
2. Weapons for which dispersal in support of non-US NATO forces is authorized for planning purposes only will be dispersed in support of US forces in the areas pending additional and specific dispersal authorization on a case-by-case basis.

(SFRD) Authorizations for weapons in support of non-US NATO forces were:

TABLE XI

SUPPORT OF NON-US FORCES FOR FY 1965


Bombs
 Tactical Missiles
 Artillery
 Air Defense

Total

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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Bombs
Tactical Missiles
Artillery
Air Defense
Total



~~(SFRD)~~

PAL devices were to be installed in all nuclear weapons dispersed or to be dispersed to NATO commands in Continental Europe for both non-US and US forces at the earliest practicable date with priority given to those weapons on QRA. Authority was also granted for exceeding the totals in each area by 10% for unforeseen contingencies, replacement of lost weapons on a one-for-one basis up to a total of [redacted] Weapons for support of non-US forces, which were not as yet operational, could be dispersed to US units.

~~(SFRD)~~ NSAM 334 also stated:

"It is understood that the currently authorized area level of nuclear warheads to be stored in Europe is adequate in numbers and megatonnage to meet requirements now recognized for use by US or non-US NATO forces. There will necessarily be changes required in the stockpile due to such things as modernization, redistribution among users, and possible changes in force dispositions. It is expected that the next and succeeding dispersal plans focus principally on changes of this sort as far as Europe is concerned, and that any recommendation for significant net increases in the European stockpile beyond the level authorized by this NSAM will be made only on the basis of new circumstances.

"Pending the completion of ADM studies now underway and the submission of further recommendations to the President, the shipment of additional ADMs to Europe is deferred. The replacement of ADMs on a one-for-one basis in connection with maintenance or modernization programs may continue."

~~(SFRD)~~ These two paragraphs, with their Presidential imprimatur, established fixed ceilings for the first time on the total number of nuclear weapons and ADMs that could be deployed in Europe for support of NATO. Also, for the

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first time, the rise of weapons for NATO Europe had been arrested. In fact, there was but a minute increase of [redacted] weapons from the [redacted] authorized in NSAM 305 to the [redacted] in NSAM 334. The numbers [redacted] and [redacted] would be carried forth and included in the subsequent dispersal plans until agreements on a NATO tactical nuclear policy could be reached within the US Government and with the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

(U) At a NATO Defense Ministers' meeting held in Paris, on May 31, 1965, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, sought to assuage the fears of our allies regarding our policy for the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe by saying:

"Since last December, the stockpile of nuclear weapons in Western Europe has increased about 10 percent. In absolute terms, as of the middle of May, over 5900 nuclear weapons were on hand in Western Europe: 1240 aerial bombs, 2400 tactical missiles, 975 nuclear projectiles, 990 air defense weapons, and 340 ADMs. Furthermore, the United States plans to deploy to Europe approximately 1800 additional nuclear warheads during the next 12 months. Implementation of these plans will increase the NATO nuclear stockpile, over the January 1961 level, by about 100 percent.

"I suggest to you, gentlemen, that there is nothing of 'denuclearization' or 'nuclear disengagement' in those figures. The real point, to my mind, is that at current levels of financial expenditure, we have already bought an extraordinary amount of tactical nuclear capability. Some of you may even think that we have over-insured ourselves in this area. We prefer it that way.

"In general with respect to our views on the use of nuclear weapons, one thing above all else should be understood: The United States is firmly committed to a forward strategy in Europe, and we propose to use whatever means may prove necessary, including nuclear weapons, to maintain those forward positions."

(U) This was followed some sixteen months later when, on Friday, September 23, 1966, Mr. McNamara made a public statement in Rome that the number of nuclear warheads in Europe was approaching 7000. The fact that Mr. McNamara felt compelled to make these statements is prima facie evidence that he recognized the degree of doubt

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permeating the capitols of Western Europe. It was evident that there was a decided need for greater participation by NATO in nuclear planning affairs if the situation was to be ameliorated.

(SFRD) An ill-fated attempt was made for greater NATO participation in nuclear operations when an approved NSAM 197 action on April 23, 1964, provided for US support of a NATO multilateral force of [REDACTED] missiles and warheads per vessel. The participating countries were to be [REDACTED]. This proposal by the US never did get out of the discussion stages in the North Atlantic Council.

(SFRD) One final action occurred late in 1965, concerning the FY 66 dispersal plan. NSAM 334 was amended on December 18, 1965, to permit the dispersal of [REDACTED] additional nuclear weapons (strategic bombs) on Guam, and in case of weather evacuation from Guam, [REDACTED]. The basis for this request was that the Vietnam war had necessitated the deployment of B-52 bombers from CONUS bases to Guam from which they could launch strikes with conventional bombs on Viet Cong territory [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] No problems were encountered by Defense in obtaining the concurrences of State and AEC.

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CHAPTER 15

FINAL CUSTODY

1966 - 1967

(U) It would be most appropriate at this point to capsulize briefly the history of the custody of finished nuclear weapons to date. As we have seen, subsequent to the Manhattan Project, the AEC, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, maintained custody of all nuclear and non-nuclear atomic weapon components. This status of the stockpile continued until 1950, when President Truman exercised the authority granted the President in Section 6.a.(2) of the 1946 Act and directed that designated quantities of non-nuclear components be delivered to the DoD for dispersal to specific areas. In 1951, President Truman, under the same authority, directed the AEC, for the first time, to deliver to the DoD a small quantity of nuclear components to be positioned on Guam. In 1953, President Eisenhower directed the transfer to the DoD of additional nuclear components for atomic weapons. This transfer provided a nuclear capability for approximately 50% of the non-nuclear weapon components then in DoD custody.

(U) Under all of these directives, the DoD acquired custody of the transferred components. However, in 1955, when transfer of some thermonuclear weapons was authorized, President Eisenhower stated that weapons with yields of over 600 KT (even though dispersed to military units) would continue to remain in AEC custody. Therefore, this required the AEC to place custodians at many SAC bases and on ships at sea. Initially, civilian custodians were utilized, but the impracticality of this arrangement on ships was soon recognized and, as a result, in the fall of 1956, the Designated Atomic Energy Commission Military Representative (DAECMR) concept was developed. Under this arrangement, commanding officers of SAC bases and Naval combatant and ammunition ships were designated AEC Custodians (i.e., DAECMR) directly responsible to the AEC, thereby effecting AEC custody without the use of AEC civilian personnel at these locations. This concept covered all dispersal locations storing high yield weapons and continued until President Eisenhower, in 1959, directed the transfer of custody to the DoD of all weapons dispersed to the DoD including for the first time, those with yields in excess of 600 KT. The total number of weapons transferred to the DoD at that time constituted approximately 82% of the stockpile.

(U) Subsequent actions had authorized the transfer of continuously growing percentages of the total stockpile to the DoD. President Kennedy's consideration of the FY 1961 dispersal program included a requirement for retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites. Part of this reserve was to remain in AEC custody. The approval of the FY 1964 dispersal

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plan, for the first time, gave priority to meeting the authorized transfer to the DoD with the remainder to be retained in AEC custody. The FY 1965/1966 dispersal program authorized transfer to the DoD of all but 1800 weapons of the approved FY 1966 nuclear weapons stockpile. These 1800 weapons, which could be reduced by up to 400 to provide replacements for weapons withdrawn for stockpile sampling and modernization, only constituted about 6% of the FY 1966 nuclear weapons stockpile.

—(U) By this time, the AEC became convinced that no practical purpose was being served in retaining custody of this small number of weapons. There was a duplication in staffing because the AEC stored its portion of the stockpile at eight DoD storage sites within the continental United States. The transfer of all finished weapons would eliminate the need for 36 personnel positions in these sites and save the AEC \$293,000 annually. Accordingly, Dr. Seaborg proposed transferring all finished weapons to DoD in a letter to Mr. Vance of July 11, 1966. He included drafts of a letter to the President and a NSAM which directed the transfer. In reply, the Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed in the desirability of the proposal but believed it was advisable to conclude a revision of the existing stockpile agreement prior to sending the proposal to the President.

(U) In a series of exchanges from November 1966 to January 1967, various changes were worked out by the AEC and DoD. The most contentious issue concerning the letter to the President and draft NSAM included summary statements of AEC responsibilities in connection with atomic weapons as derived from its interpretation of Executive Order 10841 and NSAMs 51, 197, and 272 and the Secretary of Defense letters of January 27, 1959 and May 17, 1961. DoD believed that inclusion of these interpretations in the letter and NSAM would serve to promulgate them as dogma. The AEC indicated that omission of these summary statements implied a DoD lack of a clear understanding of AEC's responsibilities.

(U) Meanwhile, the Field Command of DASA and the AEC's Albuquerque Operations Office (ALOO) were revising agreements then in effect; the Stockpile Operations Agreement of 1961, the AEC-DoD Atomic Weapons Maneuver and Exercise Agreement of July 11, 1963, and the AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Weapons dated March 4, 1960. Some difficulties arose relative to storage of weapons and transfer points since these areas had a direct bearing on AEC and DoD responsibilities for transportation costs, carriers and guards associated with weapons shipments.

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(U) DoD and AEC finally agreed that the letter to the President and draft NSAM would only reference AEC's responsibilities and also that continuing AEC and DoD responsibilities and procedures would not be changed except incident to the removal of the AEC custodians at the stockpile sites (NSSs and OSSs). On January 30, 1967, Dr. Seaborg sent the agreed letter to the President with the draft NSAM. Eleven days later the President directed the AEC to deliver such weapons and components to the Department of Defense at locations, times and in accordance with such procedures that were mutually agreeable between AEC and DoD. After all that effort, the draft NSAM was never issued.

(U) Dr. Seaborg signed the new Stockpile Agreement on March 10, 1967, followed by Mr. Vance on March 20. The Stockpile Agreement provided inter alia for the transfer of all finished weapons from the custody of AEC to the DoD, and continuing AEC and DoD responsibilities in the areas of stockpile readiness, inspections, quality assurance, retrofit programs, replacement of stockpile limited life components, retirement, transportation, procurement, budgeting and records and reports. DoD, consistent with its operational requirements, agreed to provide AEC with facilities at the NSSs and OSSs for storage of material and for such other purposes as mutually agreed. AEC would expedite the completion of weapons and components requested by the DoD which are in process at AEC production facilities during periods of increased tension, if feasible and not inconsistent with other Presidential directives.

(U) What had begun in bitter dispute some 21 years before had ended in amicable harmony. Many factors contributed to this evolution. It was finally accepted that AEC custody of the mated warheads on Titan and Minuteman missiles in silos, Polaris in submarines and Pershing on launchers, along with nuclear bombs loaded on QRA aircraft, with their attendant release procedures, would seriously degrade our deterrent and defensive capabilities. The time for operational decisions had been reduced from hours to minutes for meeting operational requirements. AEC's participation with DoD in safety, security, command and control, and dispersal procedures had immeasurably assisted in easing the transition of custody. Thus was completed the evolution of the custody of finished nuclear weapons.

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CHAPTER 16

DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC
1966 - 1968

(~~SPRD~~)

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forces in West Germany. This was reflected in the JCS FY 1967 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Program submitted to the Secretary of Defense in September 1966. The program proposed that the warheads originally planned for [REDACTED] be dispersed to U.S. units in West Germany. It called for [REDACTED] weapons in DoD custody out of a projected stockpile of 31,864 nuclear elements. The JCS reserve would consist of [REDACTED] weapons of which [REDACTED] would be in the custody of AEC. The big issue again raised by the JCS was the established ceilings of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for NATO Europe in NSAM 334. The JCS objected to these ceilings on the grounds they were arbitrary and illogical. They proposed a total of [REDACTED] warheads for NATO Europe in FY 67 to include [REDACTED] ADMs. In answer to this proposal, DoD notified the JCS that the NSAM 334 ceilings would remain in effect for FY 67. These ceilings had been supported in the Final Draft Memorandum for the President on Theater Nuclear Forces dated August 31, 1966, which offered the official DoD position. Accordingly, the JCS were requested to provide assistance in drafting a new dispersal program for NATO Europe.

(~~SPRD~~) A revised plan was drafted which held to the NSAM 334 ceilings but which permitted a five percent increase of [REDACTED] weapons in the Pacific. Both ASD(ISA) and ASD(SA), in November 1966, nonconcurred in the proposed Pacific increase by quoting a statement in the Theater Nuclear Forces DPM which said:

"It is not clear that our current deployments are optimum for either military or political requirements in Asia. We do not yet have adequate studies to reach sound judgments of the question of the proper size and composition of our nuclear arsenal. Until such studies are completed I do not believe that any increase in our Pacific theater based nuclear forces is warranted." (underlining added)

Their primary concern was the last sentence in the above quote which, as it turned out, had not been included in the "For Comment" draft that had been circulated to the OSD staff, the JCS and the Services. ATSD(AE)

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recommended to Mr. Vance that he approve the dispersal plan as written, stating inter alia that pending the outcome of the studies and in the absence of a persuasive argument to support the views of ISA and SA, OSD action to halt dispersals would seem precipitous and arbitrary. Mr. Vance did approve the plan which was sent to State and AEC in February 1967 for their concurrence.

(U) The State Department agreed on April 18th noting, however, that the plan did recall the past interest expressed by Secretary Rusk in the need for a thorough study of nuclear weapons policies in the Far East. Mr. Kohler also indicated that State was looking forward to reviewing the studies with the OSD staff.

(U) AEC suggested some changes to the plan in their May 10th concurrence. All of the changes except one were included in the plan. DoD preferred to base the dispersal plan on the approved FY 67 rather than the FY 68 stockpile. The plan also was revised to cover FY 68, as well as FY 67, and to reflect the revised agreement between DoD and AEC of March 10th relating to the transfer of all finished weapons to DoD. OSD so notified both AEC and State the same day the plan was sent to the President. All was not well, however, as some errors were noted in the plan on July 5, 1967 and all copies had to be corrected. At long last, the President approved the plan and issued NSAM 364 on August 14th.

~~(SECRET)~~ A total of [REDACTED] weapons were authorized for dispersal outside CONUS and Alaska. The provisions of NSAMs 143 and 160 were continued in effect. The President did note, however, that the Pacific Theater requirements would be given further review during consideration of the next dispersal authorization request. In connection with future dispersal authorizations, the President directed that:

1. The deployment plan would be submitted annually in mid-November concurrent with the stockpile approval request.

2. The plan would establish levels in terms of total overseas, total by area, and total by type of weapons (e.g., strategic offensive, tactical air, ASW) within each region. The Secretary of Defense was granted authority to exceed the latter two control levels by 10% to meet unforeseen contingencies.

3. The Secretary of Defense was also given reasonable flexibility to alter the quantities of weapons (authorized for the end of the fiscal year) during the course of the fiscal year to cover unavoidable peaks in deployments due to logistical factors.

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4. Contingency plans would be shown separately together with adequate explanations.
5. The plan would highlight the rationale for and major changes over the previous deployment plan.
6. The DoD should obtain the concurrence of the AEC and the State Department.

The DoD plan for FY 67-68 had been approved by the President but the White House staff had added all of the additional controls on ceilings for future plans.

(~~SERD~~) NSAM 364 established weapons ceilings for FY 67-68 on each country for the end of the fiscal year which could be exceeded by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies. A total of [REDACTED] weapons was authorized for dispersal to areas under foreign sovereignty with [REDACTED] earmarked for support of non-U.S. forces. An additional [REDACTED] weapons could be dispersed to areas under U.S. control outside the continental United States. The JCS were notified by Mr. Nitze that in the execution of the plan, the dispersal of nuclear weapons should be consistent with the memorandum for the President of May 26, 1967, as well as NSAM 364. By this he meant that the ceilings of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would remain in effect even though not specifically cited in NSAM 364.

(~~TSERD~~) Nothing much transpired during the latter part of 1967. It was not until January 1968 that any event of significance occurred. As a result of policy statements in the DPM on Theater Nuclear Forces and the recommendations of ASD(SA) and ASD(ISA), Mr. Nitze notified the JCS on January 26 that relative to the development of a new Nuclear Weapons Development Ceiling Plan (NWDCP) by the JCS, no additional dispersals would be made to NATO Europe and that he desired the JCS to plan an orderly reduction in the number of weapons in NATO Europe to [REDACTED] (the level as of December 31, 1967) by June 30, 1968. The actual number of weapons in NATO Europe on January 26 was [REDACTED]. This was to be a temporary suspension until he had received and reviewed an assessment of the weapons to be deployed to NATO Europe from the JCS and ASD(SA). He also imposed ceilings on weapons [REDACTED] and afloat in the Atlantic and Pacific at the numbers actually deployed on December 31. Any dispersals over these limits had to be approved by the Secretary of Defense. He did allow a 10% overage for weapons afloat to cover ships on and off-loadings and a 60-day compensating reduction.

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(~~TSPRD~~) The Korean crisis in January and February 1968

(~~SFRD~~) On the 29th of March the JCS requested that the ceiling of weapons afloat in the Atlantic be increased from Mr. Nitze's ceiling of [REDACTED] plus 10%) to [REDACTED] plus 10%). They stated that the December 31 level was below normal. For example, the [REDACTED] was out of the fleet and was due to be loaded with [REDACTED] weapons. The OSD staff, i.e., ASD(ISA), ASD(SA) and ATSD(AE) recommended increasing the ceiling to [REDACTED] plus ten percent or a total of [REDACTED] weapons. Mr. Nitze agreed and notified the JCS on April 6 of the new ceiling.

(~~SFRD~~) By the middle of March, meanwhile, both the JCS and Systems Analysis had forwarded to Mr. Nitze their assessments of requirements for deployments to NATO Europe. Dr. Enthoven forwarded the Systems Analysis paper early in April to the JCS for comment. Mr. Nitze followed this a few days later on April 9 with another request to the JCS for an appraisal of the requirements for NATO Europe to establish priorities with the objective of reducing the total number of weapons there to [REDACTED]. The JCS review of the Systems Analysis paper highlighted the fact that their respective positions and philosophies were poles apart.

(U) The Systems Analysis position assumed that:

1. A theater nuclear war necessarily would be of limited duration and largely restricted to the engaged land battle.
2. The U.S. should employ external strategic forces as a substitute for theater nuclear forces in a war limited to NATO Europe.
3. The role of theater nuclear forces would be very limited in a general nuclear war.

This rationale, except for assumption 2, was not too far divergent from former Secretary McNamara's position in the October 1964 draft DPM, "The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy". SA believed that even a level of 7,161 weapons in Europe was in excess of NATO's needs and proposed a revision of the nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe.

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(~~SECRET~~) The JCS strongly disagreed with SA's assumptions by pointing out that the SA recommendations did not support the approved strategy for NATO Europe which was stated in MC 14/3 adopted on January 16, 1968, and in which the U.S. had concurred. The JCS reaffirmed their support of the planned level of deployments () by end FY 68) to support the defense concept for NATO Europe.

(~~TSPRD~~) Strategy, tactics and dispersals were now being reviewed, assessed, massaged, and analyzed in both Theaters. An OSD staff recommendation generated a request by Mr. Clifford to the JCS to comment on a proposed redistribution of weapons () Guam. It was felt that some weapons should be () and placed on Guam to achieve a better balance of weapons (approximately equal numbers in each area), reduce the vulnerability of weapons () and constitute a better balanced reserve of weapons on Guam, e.g., there were only () tactical bombs out of a total of some () weapons stored there. Other steps were already in progress to reduce the vulnerability of weapons () were closed down by PACOM and PALs were directed to be placed on weapons in the other sites as well as for all weapons due to be ()

(S) In answer to Mr. Clifford's memorandum, the JCS on June 25 submitted a reply which stated that the proposed redistribution would adversely affect the capability of CINCPAC to react to emergencies in the Pacific and recommended there be no change in the current tactical distribution of tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific.

By this time, however, other events had occurred and decisions made relative to the FY 69 NWDCP that need be explored in order to understand the final results of the amazing number of complex and interrelated actions which took place in a relatively short span of time.

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CHAPTER 17

DISPERSAL AUTHORIZATIONS
FY 1969 and FY 1970

(~~SECRET~~) In developing the NWDCP for FY 1969, several issues surfaced in October 1967 between the Joint Staff and OSD which were the subject of discussions between General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Nitze. The JCS objected to the ceiling of [REDACTED] and with NSAM 364 which directed controls on ceilings on weapons by category and by region. They believed that the former restriction was not consistent with NATO commitments and that the requirements for approximately [REDACTED] weapons had been stated and justified. They reiterated that the latter control was overly restrictive and thus degraded much of the flexibility needed to properly manage the dispersed stockpile. However, in a meeting on December 28, 1967, in Mr. Nitze's office, the OSD FY 1969 NWDCP was agreed to by General Wheeler, ASD(ISA) and ASD(SA). The NATO ceiling and controls remained in the plan which was sent to State and AEC for concurrence the next day.

AEC concurred in the proposed plan on February 26, 1968, subject to the inclusion of some minor revisions. State also concurred in the plan and proposed AEC revisions. Mr. Bohlen wrote further that State continued to believe that it was important to develop a better overall concept for nuclear weapons deployments in the Pacific and suggested that an approach similar to that taken on deployments in NATO Europe in the DPM on Theater Nuclear Forces might be a good model. OSD sent the plan to the President on March 9, 1968.

(~~SECRET~~) In late May the plan was hung up due to some differences between the White House Staff and OSD. The White House Staff wanted to add a statement to the effect that the ceilings were higher than the contemplated deployments. Mr. Nitze and General Wheeler believed that this would prejudice the results of the studies being conducted by JCS and Systems Analysis. The White House Staff finally agreed to delete this and OSD concurred in the insertion of statements on PAL [REDACTED] and the retention of dispersal authority by the President for support of NATO 155mm units. All these actions to establish Presidential ceilings were going on at the same time as the intra-DoD exchanges on Mr. Nitze's ceilings.

(~~SECRET~~) The President approved the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1969 and FY 1970. NSAM 370, dated June 11, 1968, incorporated the following major changes to the DoD draft submitted with the plan.

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1. The Secretary of Defense would control actual deployments and notify the President of significant changes in contemplated actual deployments within the Presidential ceilings. (Note: by letter a month later State requested to be able to comment on any significant changes.)

2. The President expressed a continued interest in the Pacific theater requirements and reasons therefor.

3. The President noted the decision in regard to the installation of PAL on certain weapons [REDACTED]

4. Authority was withheld for dispersal of 155mm nuclear rounds in support of non-US NATO units pending results of ongoing studies. (Note: Secretary Clifford had referred to these studies in his presentation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting on the Defense Planning Committee on May 10, 1968 and added "any judgment as to the need for or nature of additional nuclear artillery should be withheld until the studies I have mentioned are completed".

~~(SFRD)~~ NSAM 370 authorized DoD to deploy up to [REDACTED] weapons outside the U.S. and exceed the country and category ceilings by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies except that the total of [REDACTED] weapons in NATO Europe would not be exceeded. The procedure for case-by-case dispersals under NSAM 143 would be submitted only to meet requirements which were not identified in the annual deployment plans. Henceforth the annual NWDCP would contain the bulk of the requests for changes in support of non-US forces. The yield restrictions of NSAM 199 were amended to exempt the Mk 61 in support of U.S. forces from the [REDACTED] limitation on land based alert strike aircraft on station in NATO.

(U) The issuance of NSAM 370 returns us to the point where we stopped in discussing Mr. Nitze's ceilings.

~~(SFRD)~~ In response to a JCS request for an increase in his ceilings on weapons afloat, Mr. Nitze raised the ceiling to an overall total for all fleets of [REDACTED] tactical bombs, artillery rounds, ASW warheads, ADMs and AAW warheads to accommodate projected weapon deployments and avoid future problems related to force changes. The OSD staff, ISA, SA and AE recommended the increase and consolidation to accommodate movement of ships between fleets and avoid offloadings which had already been necessary to avoid exceeding Mr. Nitze's ceilings.

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(TSERD) On June 26, 1968, the JCS replied to Mr. Nitze's memorandum of April 9. They opposed any reduction in NATO Europe, stating that realistic priorities could not be established, and recommended that the deployment ceilings be maintained at [REDACTED] as authorized by the President, essentially reiterating the rationale expressed in their April 25 critique of the Systems Analysis assessment. The Joint Staff followed this up on July 5th with a request for reconsideration of Mr. Nitze's decision of April 1 not to permit an increase in his ceiling on weapons [REDACTED]. They requested an increase of [REDACTED] to permit the introduction of the Genie rockets for support of the F-106 squadron authorized for [REDACTED].

(S) The NSAM 370 deployment ceilings for the end of FY 1969 were lower in some cases than the Deputy Secretary of Defense's ceilings. Furthermore, Mr. Nitze's ceilings were contained in some four memoranda.

(S) It was now time to rectify any incompatibilities and issues, if necessary, in a single paper containing the additional instructions and ceilings which Mr. Nitze felt were necessary to control deployments.

(TSERD) On August 6, 1968, Mr. Nitze provided this guidance in a memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, part of which is quoted below.

"a. NATO Europe. . . My decision is that, pending new developments, deployments to NATO Europe will continue to be limited to a total of [REDACTED] weapons, which was the actual weapons level as of 26 January 1968. The provision of a 60 day grace period for compensatory reductions will not apply after 31 December 1968; instead, a 30 day grace period will apply.

"b. [REDACTED] The approval of the Secretary of Defense is required prior to actual deployment, and is deferred pending completion of detailed arrangements with the U.K. and review of the requirement at that time.

"c. Other Land Areas Outside the U.S. NSAM 370 levels apply without modification, pending further review of our deployments in the western Pacific. Wherever actual present deployments exceed the NSAM 370 levels, reduced levels should be achieved through orderly reductions by end FY 1969. The comments in JCSM-392-68 of 25 June 1968, concerning distribution of tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific, did not reflect any consideration which the JCS may have given to the vulnerability of tactical

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nuclear weapons as currently distributed in the Pacific. I am concerned both with the large number of weapons which are stored [redacted] and also with the small number of storage areas in which these weapons and those [redacted] Guam are stored. In formulating the proposed FY 1970 Presidential Deployment Ceilings, we shall consider shifts of weapons [redacted] the Marianas, Hawaii and/or CONUS.

"I have noted JCSM-426-68 of 5 July concerning deployment of Mk 25 (GENIE) warheads [redacted]. In view of the downward trend of nuclear weapons deployments in these locations, I do not consider an increase over the NSAM 370 ceilings to be advisable. I would, however, have no objection to a compensatory reduction of nuclear weapons [redacted] and of tactical defensive weapons elsewhere in the Pacific which would allow the desired GENIE deployment within the President's ceilings.

"d. Afloat. An overall total for all fleets of [redacted] tactical bombs, artillery rounds, ADMs, ASW warheads, and AAW warheads is authorized for deployment afloat. This figure has been chosen to allow for the load out of the [redacted] early in 1969.

"e. Unforeseen Contingencies. NSAM 370 allows the Presidential ceilings in each separate country/command area or the total by category of weapons within each region to be exceeded by 10 percent in the event of unforeseen contingencies; however, it prohibits exceeding the Presidential ceiling of [redacted] weapons in NATO Europe. Where I have established ceilings within the Presidential ceilings, deployments above my ceilings require the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Otherwise, I wish to be informed whenever the Presidential provision for unforeseen contingencies is used. Notification should include a description of the contingency along with an estimate of the duration of the excess deployment."

(SFRD) The President was informed of these ceilings by Mr. Nitze in a memorandum dated August 6, 1968. And thus were drawn the DoD guidelines for the dispersal of nuclear weapons in FY 69. The only other action affecting NSAM 370 ceilings was a JCS request for an increase of [redacted] strategic bombs on Guam. B-52 bombers had been deployed to Guam to conduct conventional strikes in Viet Nam. [redacted]

When NSAM 370 was submitted it was thought that the Viet Nam conflict would be terminated before the ceilings went into effect. Consequently only the [redacted] bombs needed for the B-52s which were to remain on Guam were

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requested. The initial deployment of these weapons had been requested in a similar action in late 1965. The request sailed through OSD, State and AEC and was sent to the President on December 5, 1968.

(SFRD) Meanwhile, regarding the FY 70 deployment plan, Mr. Nitze, on September 6, 1968, sent a memorandum to General Wheeler, ASD(ISA), ASD(SA) and ATSD(AE) requesting them to develop by October 1 a list of any unresolved issues in the forthcoming stockpile and deployment plans. This was followed up by a memorandum to the JCS Chairman giving guidance for the development of the deployment plan. The ceiling of [redacted] for NATO Europe would continue. No major changes were contemplated for weapons afloat, or in other areas except the Pacific, where it appeared that there could be a reduction in forward weapon deployments.

(TSFRD) General Wheeler replied on October 1st that the proposed reductions [redacted] and Mr. Nitze's ceilings for NATO Europe [redacted] total and [redacted] ADMs) and weapons afloat were the two issues associated with the deployment plan. Unlike the FY 69 NWDCP which was jointly drafted by the ATSD(AE) and JCS staffs, the JCS submitted their FY 70 plan to OSD on October 24th. The plan called for a reduction of [redacted] but with an increase of [redacted]. It also proposed increasing the ADMs in Germany [redacted] respectively and additional initial deployments of [redacted]. [redacted] were intended for US teams in support of non-US forces and planned for use in the defensive barriers of those countries. The other provisions of the plan were in accord with the previous NSAMs and the OSD guidance. The OSD staff recommended to Mr. Nitze that the NATO and afloat ceilings be maintained and there be a reduction of weapons [redacted] with a corresponding buildup on Guam.

(TSFRD) General Wheeler and Mr. Nitze met on November 4 and three days later the Chairman notified the Deputy Secretary that he objected only to the projected FY 71 figures for the Pacific which were lower than the FY 70 levels. A compromise was reached whereby the reductions in the Pacific were lessened in FY 70 but continued in the projection for FY 71. The total number of weapons reduced [redacted] on Guam [redacted] was [redacted] which would then be stored in Hawaii as that location was considered to be a part of the U.S.

(U) The final plan was drafted and succeeded in weathering some resistance from International Security Affairs and Systems Analysis. AEC and State concurred and it was sent to the President on December 20, 1968.

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(~~TSFRD~~) Two days before the Johnson administration left office NSAM 372 was issued which authorized the Department of Defense to:

1. Deploy weapons in the U.S. without limit.
2. Deploy no more than [REDACTED] weapons outside the U.S.
3. Exceed the country and category ceilings by no more than 10%.
4. Support non-U.S. forces as indicated in the plan.
5. Implement contingencies under the noted conditions. (Contingencies were treated separately.)

NSAM 372 restated the other provisions of NSAM 364 regarding PAL, as well as NSAMs 143, 197, 199, and 155mm Howitzer support of non-U.S. units. On January 25, 1969 the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin Laird, forwarded NSAM 372 to the CJCS with the statement that he planned to review it in the future. Mr. Nitze's ceilings would also remain in effect until an overall appraisal had been made of our nuclear weapons posture. The new administration was not going to make any precipitate moves but rather review, analyze, and redirect if necessary our national objectives, security policy, and strategy. Only after the decisions had been made on these objectives would the necessary changes be made on our force structure, military posture, and associated nuclear weapons stockpile and deployments.

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CHAPTER 18

CUSTODY ACTIONS AND DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATIONS

1969 - 1971

~~(CERD)~~ The question of custody of nuclear weapons arose again in 1969, this time not between DoD and AEC, but within Army Nike Hercules units in the United States. In 1961, operational requirements for the air defense of CONUS and Hawaii, as well as monetary and manpower advantages led to the assignment of missions to Army National Guard air defense units. As of January 1969 there were 44 Army National Guard (ARNG) Nike Hercules batteries in CONUS. Six more constituted all the SAM units in Hawaii. These people were and are members of the state National Guard and manned the air defense sites on the same level as their counterparts in the active Army on some 52 other sites.

~~(CERD)~~ Because the ARNG was not considered a part of the DoD at the time that the DoD was given custody of nuclear weapons deployed with ARNG Nike Hercules units in 1961, procedures were established for the maintenance of DoD custody of these weapons by the assignment of approximately six active members of the US Army to each ARNG Nike Hercules site to control transfer, movement and access to the warhead. Accountability of the warhead was maintained by Active Army Accountable Officers of Army area commands in the same manner as they were maintained for Active Army units. A Federal chain of command was established for the control of nuclear weapons by placing the ARNG Nike Hercules units under continuous operational control of appropriate Active Army air defense commanders. Nuclear weapons could be released from Federal custody to ARNG units by designated Active Army air defense commanders, prior to their actual call to Federal active duty, in surprise attack situations, or upon declaration of Defense Condition I of Air Defense Emergency providing the National Guard crews and units were under the operational control of a Federal active duty air defense commander. Release could be accomplished by issuing properly authenticated orders to the ARNG unit commander and the Active Army custodians.

~~(CERD)~~ On January 1, 1969, Public Law 90-486 changed the status of a National Guard technician so that a National Guard technician employed under provisions of the act "is an employee of the Department of the Army or Department of the Air Forces, as the case may be, and an employee of the United States." Based on a JCS request on February 24, 1969, the DoD drafted a memorandum for the President which requested

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Section 144 b., Atomic Energy Act, 1954~~

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approval to transfer custody of Nike Hercules warheads from the Active Army custodians to the National Guard technicians on duty at the sites.

~~(CFRD)~~ On July 16, 1969, Deputy Secretary Packard requested that the JCS develop additional information on the proposed transfer of custody for Army National Guard Nike Hercules batteries. He specifically desired information on the annual monetary savings; improvements in operational procedures; arguments which could be used to substantiate that there would be no degradation in safety, security or control, and the possible impact on military operations and custody by the unionization of ARNG technicians.

~~(C)~~ The JCS provided this information on October 23, 1969. Manpower and monetary savings would be approximately \$2.2 million, streamlining of operational procedures by standardization for all Air Defense units would result, standardized procedures would provide increased control by utilizing a single chain of command to authorize release of the arm plugs, and unionization would not really be a problem since Section 7311, Title 5, U.S. Code prohibits federal employees from striking.

~~(CFRD)~~ Other major actions in 1969 concerned programs of cooperation for support of non-US NATO nations with ADMs, 155mm Howitzer warheads, and the Lance missile system, and the FY 71 NWDCP iteration. These issues and some historical background are discussed below.

ADM Program of Cooperation

~~(SPRD)~~ The issue of ADM dispersals first arose in November 1963 when the FY 63-64 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization (NSAM 305) was under consideration. Commenting on the plan, U. Alexis Johnson, then Deputy Under Secretary of State, wrote the Deputy Defense Secretary, Mr. Roswell Gilpatrick, that State "would reserve judgment on the proposed dispersal of Atomic Demolition Munitions." State at that time, however, was more concerned about the large increase in nuclear weapons dispersals for support of non-US Allied forces and did not pursue the matter further. The number of ADMs authorized for deployment to Europe had risen from [redacted] to [redacted].

~~(SPRD)~~ In May 1969, State concurred on the proposed FY 65-66 dispersal plan but recommended that no additional shipments of ADMs be made to Europe pending the outcome of a forthcoming study. One week later, Mr. McNamara notified Mr. Rusk that as of that date (May 24) he had deferred the shipment of additional ADMs to Europe.

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He also noted that he expected the results of the ADM study and JCS recommendations by July of that year. The momentum of shipments of ADMs to NATO Europe, already in progress, could not be halted, however, until some five weeks later when the number of ADMs in Europe was stabilized at [REDACTED] weapons.

(~~SFRD~~) The FY 65-66 dispersal plan (NSAM 334) was signed by the President on June 1, 1965. In the forwarding memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, Mr. Vance included the following statement regarding ADMs: "Pending the completion of the ADM studies now underway and the submission of further recommendations to the President, the shipment of additional ADMs to Europe is deferred. The replacement of ADMs on a one-for-one basis in connection with maintenance or modernization programs may continue." This statement fixed a DoD ceiling of [REDACTED] ADMs which could be deployed to NATO Europe. In the NSAM, the President noted that currently authorized area level of nuclear weapons to be stored in NATO Europe was adequate in numbers and that any recommendation for significant increases would be made only on the basis of new circumstances.

(~~SFRD~~) In coordinating on the proposed FY 67-68 dispersal plan, State and DoD agreed on an ADM ceiling for NATO Europe of [REDACTED] weapons. This in effect raised the intermediate DoD ceiling to [REDACTED] weapons. Although this ceiling was not specifically cited in the text of the FY 67-68 plan (NSAM 364), the memorandum from Mr. Nitze, which forwarded the plan to the President on May 26, 1967, did state that there would be no change in the level of ADM dispersals in NATO Europe pending the outcome of current studies. Mr. Nitze also stated that there was no change in the number of weapons currently authorized for dispersal to NATO Europe [REDACTED] in NSAM 334.

(~~SFRD~~) In his memorandum for the President of March 9, 1968, forwarding the dispersal plan for FY 69, Mr. Nitze reiterated his statement of May 26, 1967, regarding ADMs. Nine months later, on December 20, 1968, the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1970-1971 was sent to the White House. Mr. Nitze informed the President that "the proposed plan reflects no change in the number of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM) on hand in Europe pending outcome of studies on the matter. The subject of ADM employment is under review, with consideration being given to development of a new, improved munition with better command and control features."

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(SERD) On May 4, 1969, SACEUR submitted a request for an ADM Program of Cooperation to the Secretary of Defense. This was followed on July 31 by a JCS request to the Secretary of Defense to obtain approval for an ADM Program of Cooperation. On September 4, 1969, the Deputy Secretary of Defense replied to the JCS request that it would be necessary to defer a decision on this matter until NSSMs 64 and 65 and the Theater Nuclear Forces DPM were completed. Two months later, Mr. Packard made the decision that DoD should go ahead and coordinate the program with State and AEC, after which he would review the matter before sending it to the President.

(SERD) The proposed program was time-phased with Phase I deployments expected to begin in FY 71. Phase I consisted of the deployment of the full number of weapons in support of non-US NATO forces in West Germany [redacted] a partial deployment of weapons [redacted] [redacted] Phase II would commence after the completion of Phase I, at which time it would be possible to consider the deployment of additional weapons [redacted] While the time to complete Phase I was somewhat indefinite, it was estimated at approximately three years from the date of approval in principle.

(SERD) The projected deployment of ADMs as then conceived is shown below:

TABLE XII
PROGRAM OF ADM SUPPORT

<u>Country Supported/Country of Storage</u>	<u>Weapons</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Phase</u>		
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	
[redacted] West Germany	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted] West Germany	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted] West Germany	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted] United Kingdom/West Germany	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted] West Germany/West Germany	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

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155mm Howitzer Program of Cooperation

~~(SFRD)~~ A Program of Cooperation for support of non-US NATO nations with 155mm Howitzer nuclear weapons was first approved in principle by the President on August 30, 1966. The Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1967-1968 (NSAM 364) authorized the deployment of [REDACTED] 155 Howitzer warheads to US units in West Germany, [REDACTED] of which were planned for support of non-US NATO forces upon approval of a projected NSAM 143 request.

~~(SEPD)~~ The DoD proposed deployment authorization for FY 69 pre-delegated the dispersal authority for 155mm warheads to the Secretary of Defense subject to the specified requirements for command, control and custody. This pre-delegation was suggested by the White House staff in order to reduce the volume of separate dispersal authorizations required on a case-by-case basis by NSAM 143. The FY 69 deployment authorization (NSAM 370), issued on June 11, 1968, while authorizing the deployment of the [REDACTED] warheads to NATO Europe, stated that prior to making firm commitments to the NATO Allies for specific support of 155mm Howitzer units, the DoD should submit the proposed action for Presidential approval together with an evaluation of the utility of such support.

~~(SFRD)~~ The basis for the change by the White House was a statement made by Mr. Clifford at the NATO Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee on May 10, 1968, wherein he cited pertinent ongoing studies and states: "...any judgment as to the need for the nature of additional nuclear artillery should be withheld until the studies I have mentioned have been completed." (NOTE: Mr. Clifford's remarks were strongly influenced by his assistants for Systems Analysis and International Security Affairs who opposed any further increase of nuclear weapons in NATO Europe and used the "study routine" as a means of further delay.) In view of that statement, the White House staff felt that pre-delegation of the dispersal authority was not appropriate. The dispersal authority for FY 70 (NSAM 372) contained the same restriction as NSAM 370 since the 155mm Howitzer program of cooperation was not yet firm.

~~(SEPD)~~ The JCS NWDCP for FY 71 contained projected deployments for both ADMs and 155mm warheads in support of these programs of cooperation. As a result of meetings in November 1969 between the Joint Staff and the staffs of ATSD(AE), ASD(ISA) and ASD(SA), an OSD ceiling plan was developed which included the projected deployments of ADMs and 155mm warheads. The deployment of 155mm

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warheads in support of the allies would be time-phased similar to the ADM plan with a smaller ratio of weapons going to [REDACTED] in the initial phase. The draft memorandum for the President which would forward the plan, requested reauthorization of the 155mm Howitzer Program of Cooperation and deployments, and authority for ADM deployments; contingent on Presidential approval of the projected ADM Program of Cooperation.

1971 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Ceiling Plan

(TSFRD) The OSD draft FY 1971 plan was essentially the same as the approved FY 1970 plan (NSAM 372) with the exception of the aforementioned 155mm Howitzer and ADM deployments and some other changes which were minor. The plan proposed a ceiling of [REDACTED] weapons outside the US and continued the ceiling of [REDACTED] weapons in NATO Europe. There was a reduction of [REDACTED] weapons authorized for deployment [REDACTED] and an increase of [REDACTED] weapons on Guam in anticipation of the denuclearization [REDACTED]. The withdrawal of all nuclear weapons [REDACTED] and their redeployment remained to be addressed in a separate action after decisions were made on force structure in the Pacific. Coordination with State and AEC had yet to be accomplished by the end of 1969. Preliminary indications were, however, that it would sail through relatively unscathed. State's concern with the politico-military situation [REDACTED] had been anticipated.

Lance Program of Cooperation

(SFRD) The last major proposal in 1969 concerned the new Lance missile system. Three years prior, on July 8, 1966, the President had approved a program of cooperation for support of our NATO allies with the Lance weapons system. The program, at that time, envisioned replacement of the allied Honest John Launchers on no more than a one-for-one basis. Warhead support would also consist of no more than a one-for-one replacement of the Honest John warheads with Lance warheads.

(SFRD) The development of the original Lance missile with a range of 75 kilometers and a nuclear and non-nuclear capability was cancelled by the Secretary of Defense on December 15, 1967. That decision was made in order to reorient the Lance development and go forward with an extended range Lance (XRL) missile system which was also under study. The XRL offered greater promise with a programmed range of

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140 kilometers than did the original Lance with the 75 kilometer range. At this time the US informed its NATO Allies that development of the Lance missile system had been halted due to technological difficulties, that a reappraisal of the system was being made, and that they would be notified when firm decisions had been made relative to the future system. The Lance missile and development then proceeded to the point that six US Lance battalions were programmed to replace four divisional and five corps Honest John battalions and four Sergeant battalions in Europe during CY 72-73. A total of [REDACTED] Lance warheads would replace [REDACTED] Honest John and [REDACTED] Sergeant warheads in NATO Europe when all US Lance units were fielded.

~~(SERD)~~ In response to a memorandum from Mr. Nitze in January 1969, the JCS submitted a revised Lance Program of Cooperation to OSD in October of the same year. The proposed program would permit replacement of the allied Honest John and Sergeant systems and the retired UK Corporal units. Estimates of the number of Lance battalions which the allies would purchase ranged from 15 to 33. The number of Lance warheads for support of these units also varied in estimates between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

~~(SERD)~~ By the close of 1969, the draft NWDCP for FY 71, the proposed 155mm Program of Cooperation, and the ADM and Lance Programs of Cooperation had all been coordinated within DoD and were due to go to State and AEC for coordination and concurrences. Still outstanding also were the major decisions to be made on the national security studies which would affect our entire nuclear as well as conventional posture.

~~(SERD)~~ On January 20, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the President, requested approval of the JCS proposal to transfer custody of the Nike Hercules warheads from Active Army custodians to Army National Guard technicians. It was noted that approximately 280 Active Army personnel would be released for assignment to other duties which would realize a monetary savings of \$2.3 million annually and would also improve operational procedures.

~~(TSERD)~~ On February 6, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the President, requested approval of the NWDCP for FY 71. The main changes in this plan included a reduction by [REDACTED] weapons [REDACTED] an increase in total weapons [REDACTED] and an increase of weapons on Guam by [REDACTED]. The initial deployment of 155mm

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Howitzer weapons to Europe under the program of cooperation, although included in the plan, would not occur until country agreements were reached, custodial arrangements were concluded, and units and facilities were operational. The inclusion of [REDACTED] additional ADMs into Europe reflected the first phase of the ADM program of cooperation, but actual deployment would be withheld pending Presidential approval of the program and fulfillment of all the requirements for support of non-US NATO forces. These increases would then be accomplished within the established NATO Europe ceiling of [REDACTED] weapons. If approved, this plan would authorize a ceiling of [REDACTED] weapons to be deployed outside CONUS in FY 71 as compared to [REDACTED] at end FY 70 and [REDACTED] at end FY 69. The requested afloat ceiling would be [REDACTED] compared to the end FY 70 total of [REDACTED] and end FY 60 total of [REDACTED]

(S) Dr. Kissinger notified the Secretary on February 20, 1970, that the President had approved the transfer of custody of nuclear weapons at National Guard Nike Hercules sites from Army active duty custodians to National Guard custodians who were employed by the Federal Government. He desired that implementation policy and instructions assure that standards of control then applying to Army active duty custodians were continued when custody was transferred to the National Guard technicians.

(~~SECRET~~) On March 2, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense notified the JCS that Presidential approval had been obtained for transferring the custody of nuclear weapons at National Guard Nike Hercules sites from active duty Army custodians to Army National Guard technicians. The transfer was subject to maintaining the same standards of control as were then applied to the active duty Army custodians. Implementation policy and guidance statements given the JCS are enumerated at Appendix F.

(~~SECRET~~) On April 2, 1970, Secretary of Defense Laird requested Presidential approval in principle for the Lance program of cooperation which formally proposed the modernization of non-US NATO forces by replacing the Honest John and Sergeant systems with the Lance and was a revision of the previously approved program of July 8, 1966. Due to substantial changes in the system such as a new warhead and a greater range capability, it was deemed appropriate to submit the revised program for approval in principle.

(~~SECRET~~) On April 11, 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard requested Presidential approval in principle for a program of cooperation for Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM)s. The proposed program anticipated more effective use of manpower and resources available to Allied Command Europe (ACE) by

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the formation of non-US NATO ADM teams with attached US custodians. All weapons would be equipped with external combination lock-type PAL devices prior to dispersal, be stored in approved storage sites and be under US custody and control procedures. It was realized, and so stated to the President, that ADMs could pose particular command and control problems stemming from the need to avoid pressures for premature transition from non-nuclear to nuclear conflict while providing for timely use of the munitions once the decision to employ them was made. To forestall undue pressures for early release the additional ADMs to be deployed would, like those already in the NATO area, be subject to the following US guidelines which had been provided to the NATO Military Committee, SHAPE and EUCOM:

"a. Military plans will be so predicated that they do not depend on assured release of ADMs.

"b. The physical positioning of ADMs, within deployment authorizations, may be planned as a military decision. However, when ADMs are positioned forward of the main battle position, provisions will be made for rapid evacuation in the event a political decision to use ADMs is not made in time to prevent potential military overrun.

"c. Plans for the emplacement and/or firing of ADMs should take into account the requirement to obtain first the approval of the national command authority. Such approval may be given for emplacement and firing together; or for emplacement only, followed by separate approval later for firing.

"d. Custodial requirements will cease only after approval for firing has been given by the national command authority."

(~~ECUO~~) Deputy Secretary Packard forwarded additional information to Dr. Kissinger on April 16, 1970, answering some questions he had on the 155mm Howitzer Program of Cooperation.

(~~TSEFB~~) The President approved the NWDCP for FY 71 (NSDM 60) on May 9, 1970. He desired that the NATO ceiling be resubmitted with revised tables; total deployments outside the US would not exceed [REDACTED] plus the currently planned NATO ceiling rather than the requested [REDACTED] approval of the [REDACTED] ADMs to Europe was withheld pending Presidential decision on the ADM program of cooperation; ceilings [REDACTED] were approved; provisions of NSAMs 143, 197 and 370 would continue to apply; and that all weapons [REDACTED] were to be PAL-equipped by June 30, 1970. Yield restrictions of NSAMs 143, 197 and 370 were also continued.

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(S) On June 12, 1970, the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that authorization be given to Air National Guard technicians in nuclear-equipped F-101 units to control the transfer and movement of, and access to, nuclear weapons and to maintain accountability for them. The JCS also recommended that the same authorization apply to the Air National Guard operation of the F-106 aircraft if and when assigned. JCS stated that approval would result in a net savings of three personnel per squadron, elimination of an active duty Air Force custodial detachment at each base, and the attendant administrative support. This action was a natural follow-on to the Army Nike Hercules custody transfer of the previous year. Additional rationale to support their request was presented as follows:

(~~SECRET~~) As a result of Program/Budget Project 703, three Aerospace Defense Command active squadrons, equipped with F-101 aircraft and the AIR-2A (GENIE), were inactivated and their aircraft transferred to ANG units located at Bangor, Fargo and Spokane. Each squadron had 18 aircraft. These ANG units were then in training. It was estimated that the first unit, Bangor, would be operationally ready by late summer or early fall. Weapons were located at Bangor for a collocated active ADC F-106 squadron. When the ANG unit was operationally ready, weapons would be made available, but would remain in the custody of active Air Force personnel until the change in policy was approved. The active Air Force would have a 13-man custodial team located at each of the three ANG bases. These personnel (11 security police and 2 maintenance technicians) would maintain custody of the nuclear weapons by manning the entry control points and controlling access to the storage, alert and mass load areas, in addition to functioning as convoy commander when weapons were moved to and from the above areas.

(S) ADC maintained custody of the AIR-2A rocket at ANG organizations by:

- a. Assuring continuity and retention of federal control during storage, maintenance, delivery and ground alert.
- b. Maintaining control of the location of the rockets within the ANG complex.

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(U) The proposed change in policy would result in the improvement of operational procedures since the commander having the mission responsibility would then have control of the total resources required to perform the assigned mission, thus, streamlining the command channel of responsibility.

~~(TSFRD)~~ On November 20, 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority given to the Secretary of Defense by the President, to increase approved deployment levels in NATO Europe when specified conditional deployments were made and to increase specified deployments in any theater up to 10 percent when necessary to meet contingencies. He also desired that he be informed of such actions, the reasons for these actions, and, in the case of contingencies, the expected date of restoration of the authorized level.

~~(S)~~ Secretary Laird notified the JCS on December 22, 1970, that the apparent savings on the Air National Guard transfer of custody proposal did not appear sufficiently strong to warrant submission to the President and suggested a resubmission at a later time when it appeared that manpower and monetary savings would be more extensive.

~~(TSFRD)~~ On January 16, 1971, Under Secretary of State Johnson, in a letter to Deputy Secretary Packard, requested consideration of some points that State had in regard to [REDACTED] deployments. Mr. Johnson said he would be reluctant to accept increases of deployments on foreign territory resulting from their removal [REDACTED], would agree to additional tactical bombs [REDACTED] if a commensurate reduction in tactical ground support weapons were made, would encourage removal of all nuclear weapons [REDACTED] and would discourage any increase of deployments [REDACTED] due to political reasons.

~~(TSFRD)~~ Mr. Packard replied to Mr. Johnson on February 9th by stating that Defense did not see any need for additional construction or deployments [REDACTED] discussed the increase of tactical bombs [REDACTED] as necessary to maintain the status quo due to loss of visibility and reserve stocks [REDACTED] redistribution would partially compensate for the lost [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(TSFRD)~~ On March 3, 1971, Air Force Secretary Seamans requested Secretary of Defense approval of consolidation of facilities [REDACTED] Specifically, the Air Force desired to combine all nuclear weapons [REDACTED] and to remove all activities except WRM storage from [REDACTED]

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(TSFRD) Mr. Packard approved this request on March 30th and concurred in the plan to construct a [redacted] nuclear weapon storage facility [redacted]

(TSFRD) On May 24, 1971, Mr. Packard forwarded the proposed deployment plan for FY 72 to the President. The plan contained the following principal changes from the previous year:

- a. Reflected nuclear weapon re-basing required by [redacted] by deploying [redacted] additional tactical nuclear bombs [redacted] and simultaneously reducing Army deployments by [redacted] weapons, deploying [redacted] additional tactical nuclear bombs [redacted] deploying [redacted] additional tactical nuclear bombs and [redacted] additional ASW weapons [redacted] providing balanced reserve on Guam for support of forward areas [redacted] and returning weapons then stored [redacted] to Hawaii or CONUS.
- b. Increased authorizations in NATO Europe from [redacted] to [redacted] to allow introduction of [redacted] WALLEYE air-to-surface missiles and [redacted] ADMs.
- c. Decreased deployments in the Atlantic region by [redacted] weapons by removing [redacted] ASW weapons from [redacted] and increasing by [redacted] strategic bombs to Puerto Rico.
- d. Increased afloat totals from [redacted] to [redacted] to take into consideration the scheduled deployments of POSEIDON missiles.

(TSFRD) The President approved the NWDCP for FY 72 (NSDM 121) on July 21, 1971, with the exception of planned deployments [redacted]. He forbade additional tactical nuclear weapons deployments [redacted] and desired that these weapons be deployed instead to US territory, possessions, or afloat in the Pacific theater or returned to CONUS. In addition, he requested that more information be included in the FY 73 plan such as deployments required in support of specified US and NATO contingency war plans and SIOP; regional threats in terms of numbers and types of targets, weapons, delivery forces available and objectives to be achieved by use of the weapons against the identified threat target systems; the US (CONUS and overseas) and allied nuclear delivery units in approved force plans be identified by unit types and numbers of delivery vehicles and delivery vehicle loading factors; and the rationale for significant changes in overseas

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deployments requested for FY 73 or projected for FY 74.

(~~TSFRD~~) On August 17, 1971, Air Force Secretary Seamans requested Secretary of Defense approval for construction of storage facilities [REDACTED] for only [REDACTED] weapons maintained [REDACTED] since the President did not approve the deployment of the additional [REDACTED] weapons [REDACTED]

(~~TSFRD~~) In replying, Secretary Seamans, on September 3, 1971, Mr. Packard stated that he deemed it prudent to postpone construction of nuclear storage facilities [REDACTED]

(U) Effective November 3, 1971, the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) was redesignated the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) by DoD Directive 5105.31.

(S) The JCS resubmitted the Air National Guard proposal on December 7, 1971, to the Secretary of Defense since, with the recently approved safety rules for ANG operation of the F-101B/AIR-2A weapon system, inclusion of monitoring as well as custodial functions would result in an increase in the strength of active Air Force custodial detachments to an average of 17 personnel - four over the previously planned strength for each of the F-101 units. The JCS stated that the annual support cost for the 100 active Air Force personnel would be \$823,000. The ANG assumption of custodial functions would require 50 technicians to augment the current authorization at an additional cost of \$420,000. Replacing 100 active Air Force personnel by 50 ANG technicians would result in a savings of approximately \$403,000. The JCS further stated that an additional annual savings of \$300,000 and 40 manpower spaces could be realized when the ANG received four squadrons of F-106 aircraft by the end of FY 73.

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CHAPTER 19

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DEPLOYMENT
AUTHORIZATIONS

1972

(TSPRD) Immediately upon the completion of President Nixon's [REDACTED] Secretary Laird sent [REDACTED] for the purpose of providing him a current first-hand report on the circumstances surrounding the security of our nuclear weapons. His findings indicated that [REDACTED] had conducted themselves well in their relations with US personnel. Nuclear weapon storage was not discussed [REDACTED] had cooperated fully with US security personnel by providing base security outside US storage and aircraft areas unobtrusively. [REDACTED] did not react overtly in any way to nuclear weapons movements [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In summary, close and friendly relations [REDACTED] continued and this relationship was not likely to change in the near future in the opinion of the Embassy staff as well as US military officials there. The personnel at the storage site were well trained and led and the storage facilities, while modest, were considered adequate from a security point of view.

(TSPRD) On January 31, 1972, the JCS submitted their final proposed Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan for FY 1973. The principal change to this plan was for increased POSEIDON missile deployments.

(TSPRD) The ATSD(AE) presented the deployment issues to Secretary Laird on the same day. These issues and the ATSD(AE)'s recommended solutions were:

- a. Retain some nuclear weapons in Europe as MBFR "bargaining chips."
- b. Approve the JCS request for [REDACTED] tactical nuclear bombs [REDACTED]
- c. Continue deployment of [REDACTED] ADMs to West Germany instead of the [REDACTED] requested by the JCS primarily due to political and military undesirability.

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- d. Hold tactical nuclear bombs for US forces [REDACTED] at present levels on the grounds that the JCS rationale did not adequately justify the slight increase.
- e. Propose maintaining current authorization of strategic nuclear bombs at [REDACTED]. JCS requested an increase to [REDACTED] but the Secretary of Defense decision of October 16, 1970, deferred this request.

(U) Secretary Laird approved the ATSD(AE) recommendations on February 1, 1972.

(SFRD) On March 27, 1972, the President was notified by Deputy Secretary Rush that all nuclear weapons had been removed [REDACTED] as of March 21, 1972, and also informed the President that there had been no public reaction to the shipments. This action was necessary [REDACTED]

(TSFRD) As a result of the ATSD(AE)'s report [REDACTED] Secretary Laird, on March 27, 1972, issued guidance to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chairman, JCS, regarding nuclear operations [REDACTED] directing that:

- a. Nuclear weapon deployments [REDACTED] be reduced gradually to no more than [REDACTED] by the end of CY 1972. If necessary, this number would be reduced further (as required by the weapons mix) so that the number deployed would be no more than could be removed by [REDACTED] under emergency evacuation conditions. This reduction would streamline nuclear operations [REDACTED] so as to facilitate all emergency actions should any be required in the future.
- b. Plan to continue nuclear weapon storage [REDACTED] although at a reduced level. It would be understood that future events may lead to total withdrawal of nuclear weapons [REDACTED]
- c. Plans for construction of a nuclear storage facility [REDACTED] would be held in abeyance.
- d. The improvements to the physical security of the nuclear storage area [REDACTED] including sensor installations, which had been postponed pending a [REDACTED] would now be completed expeditiously.

(TSFRD) On March 31, 1972, Secretary Laird reported to the President that his review of [REDACTED] had been completed. Mr. Laird

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informed the President that he had directed the following actions: (1) gradual reduction in nuclear weapons deployments to about half the authorized limit [REDACTED]; (2) holding in abeyance plans for the construction of a nuclear storage facility [REDACTED] and (3) the expeditious completion of modest improvements in the physical security of the nuclear storage area [REDACTED]. Secretary Laird also informed the President that the reduction in the number of weapons deployed to [REDACTED] while facilitating such emergency actions as might become necessary of weapons deployed forward [REDACTED] the SIOP strike plans, would be fully covered. It was also specifically stated that the removal of weapons should not be obvious to [REDACTED]

(~~SECRET~~) On 9 May 1972, in response to requests for rationale of deployments and stockpile plans outlined in NSDMs 121 and 128, the Deputy Secretary forwarded a study on war plans information to the President. The study explained that to support the National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, the DoD based nuclear weapons stockpile requirements on a real war-fighting capability; and deployed nuclear weapons to provide a credible perception of resolve to use the weapons if necessary. General and contingency war plans provided a range of conventional and nuclear options within the limits of current force capabilities. The level and mix of nuclear warheads in the current stockpile was based upon the capability to engage and defeat a comprehensive target system while meeting material and budgeting constraints. The capabilities of our strategic offensive forces were integrated in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to provide for their most effective employment against preplanned targets. The US stockpile of strategic warheads did not provide the capability to defeat the complete enemy target system, however, through the ability to respond after absorbing a first strike, it provided, in conjunction with other force elements, a high confidence of deterring an all-out surprise attack. Plans for employment of nuclear weapons for tasks not incorporated into the SIOP were based on the assumption that early nuclear weapons employment would not be authorized except in response to an enemy nuclear attack or other most compelling circumstances. However, plans did include provisions for use of nuclear weapons at any stage of a conflict during which their employment could be justified from a military standpoint. As a result, the stockpile provided a range of capabilities that permits nuclear responses appropriate to a wide variety of situations. Projection of future stockpile needs in view of an expanding and increasingly complex target system was recommended.

(~~SECRET~~) The study then developed in more detail five specific categories of discussion. These categories and main comments were:

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a. Strategic Offensive Weapons -- which discussed targeting, weapons application and expected damage related to the SIOP. It also included discussion on recovery and reconstitution of the strategic bomber force, other contingencies involving these forces, a summary of the characteristics of the strategic weapons stockpile and indications of current force loading.

b. Strategic Defensive Weapons -- summarized current capabilities in terms of types and yields of warheads, numbers of delivery vehicles and vehicle load factors.

c. Theater Nuclear Weapons--Europe -- described the current relationships of the SIOP to NATO's theater nuclear strike forces, summarized key elements of SACEUR's General Strike Plan relative to the attack of fixed targets and described the targeting concept in SACEUR's Regional Defense Plan for application against non-fixed targets. It further identified the principal shortcomings in the quality of the current tactical nuclear weapons stockpile. The quantity of weapons allocated to CINCEUR in FY 1972 was compared with SACEUR's estimates of weapons requirements and included a summary of changes in nuclear weapon deployments proposed in FY 1973 for NATO Europe.

d. Theater Nuclear Weapons--Atlantic -- summarized nuclear weapons requirements for the region related to the SIOP, support for SACEUR and support for the execution of other contingencies. It described general purpose naval force nuclear weapon requirements for conflict-at-sea in both the Atlantic and Pacific and indicated overall stockpile composition and force loading for nuclear antisubmarine and naval surface-to-air warheads.

e. Theater Nuclear Weapons--Pacific -- dealt with weapons requirements for SIOP and other strategic commitments in the Pacific region and with the single contingency in Asia requiring the largest probable expenditure of nuclear weapons. It also summarized principal changes proposed for nuclear deployments in the Pacific in FY 1973.

~~(TSFRD)~~ Deputy Secretary Rush forwarded the FY 1973 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan to the President for approval on May 11, 1972. Significant changes from the previous year were listed as follows:

- a. [REDACTED] review of other requirements, Westpac deployments would decrease from [REDACTED] in FY 72 to [REDACTED] for FY 73.
- b. A decrease in NATO Europe of [REDACTED] in FY 72 to [REDACTED] in FY 73 resulting from withdrawal of [REDACTED] tactical bombs from US forces in Germany,

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introduction of [REDACTED] aircraft previously supported by US bombs, and withdrawal of Honest John and Sergeant missiles in conjunction with the planned introduction of the Lance for US forces.

- c. Atlantic deployments would be reduced by [REDACTED] weapons due to termination of SAC operations at Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico, ([REDACTED] bombs) and deactivation of the Bomarc system ([REDACTED] warheads) [REDACTED]
- d. Increase of weapons afloat from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] which reflected additional Poseidon missile deployments.

(~~TSFRD~~) The President approved the NWDCP for FY 1973 (NSDM 178) on July 18, 1972. He stipulated that deployment of 155mm projectiles for support of non-US NATO units would be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the authorization for these weapons with US forces in West Germany; that the Secretary of Defense determine at the appropriate time whether deployments in support of the ADM program of cooperation be accompanied by corresponding increases in the total number of these weapons in NATO Europe; that PAL's be installed on all the remaining nuclear weapons [REDACTED] not included under NSDM 60; and that all nuclear weapons [REDACTED] be PAL equipped. He also requested that, for the FY 74 plan, a rationale be provided for any significant changes in overseas or afloat deployments including a discussion of military objectives and capabilities affected by such changes in the deployments and that a total deployment program and schedule be shown for the weapon systems requested to be deployed in support of US or allied forces during this period.

(C) On September 13, 1972, Secretary Laird requested Presidential approval of the proposal to transfer custody to the Air National Guard.

(S) Dr. Kissinger notified the Secretary of Defense on October 24, 1972, that the President approved the transfer of custody of nuclear weapons to Air National Guard units equipped with F-101B or F-106 aircraft and AIR-2A/W25 GENIE nuclear weapons. The President also expressed the desire that implementing instructions and policy statements assure that standards of control required of Air Force active duty custodians were equally applicable to ANG technicians having custody of nuclear weapons.

(S) One week later, Deputy Secretary Rush notified the JCS that Presidential approval had been obtained for the transfer of custody to the Air National Guard and attached the policy and guidance statements for implementing the transfer. These statements are enumerated in Appendix G.

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(TSEFB) In late November, after joint preparation by the Defense and State Department staffs, a joint memorandum to the President was forwarded summarizing the political and military impact of removal of nuclear weapons

[REDACTED] This memorandum was based on the premise that the US commitment [REDACTED]

may at some time make it necessary to consider withdrawal of our nuclear weapons. It was noted that neither State nor Defense advocated the removal of our weapons [REDACTED] at that time. The paper examined the military and political factors associated with such a decision in the context of programmed force deployments and existing policy guidance. Contents of the paper follow:

"Authority has existed for the deployment of nuclear weapons [REDACTED] since mid-1957. Actual deployment of nuclear weapons first occurred in January 1958 (for the nuclear-armed Matador cruise missile). The first nuclear bombs were deployed [REDACTED] early in 1960. Today only tactical nuclear bombs are stored [REDACTED]

"The authorized level is [REDACTED] bombs; however, in March of this year the Secretary of Defense directed that these be reduced gradually to [REDACTED] by the end of this calendar year in order to improve our ability to control these weapons if required; for instance, we would be able to remove all of our weapons [REDACTED], or we would be prepared for more rapid emergency disablement (or destruction) of our weapons. On February 19, 1972, the Secretary of Defense directed that PAL's (electromechanical locking devices) be installed by the end of this calendar year on all nuclear weapons stored [REDACTED] as a means of providing additional protection. Other steps are being taken to increase the physical security of our nuclear storage area [REDACTED]

"For some years the US had maintained a continuous 24 hour nuclear alert [REDACTED] recently with two and sometimes with four [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On February 18, 1972, these aircraft were withdrawn to augment our [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was notified before these aircraft were redeployed and was informed that they will be returned [REDACTED]. The aircraft have not yet resumed QRA status but are expected to do so in the near future at no higher level than previously. You recently approved [REDACTED] deployment plan for end FY 73 which includes continued deployment of four SIOP alert [REDACTED]

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"Warfighting Considerations

"Four SIOP sorties are planned to be launched with [REDACTED]. These forces form a very small portion of the US nuclear forces currently targeted in the SIOP against [REDACTED] and thus it can be said that they play only a relatively minor role in attacking the [REDACTED] threat. If these [REDACTED] our weapons were removed, we might redeploy them during periods of crisis, assuming this right is maintained, or we might assign these four sorties to aircraft carriers, Polaris submarines, or B-52's [REDACTED]. Therefore, decisions concerning nuclear weapons [REDACTED] should be based primarily on considerations other than the function of these weapons in the SIOP.

"Beyond the SIOP, contingency plans relating to the defense [REDACTED] as well as the overall theater general war plan, [REDACTED]. In fact, there are 159 contingency targets (e.g., port facilities, airfields, POL and other military targets) [REDACTED] which land-based [REDACTED] can reach only from bases [REDACTED].

"Of course, the precise number of these targets that would be struck depends upon the situation at the time and the particular planning option selected. Also, as in the SIOP, if aircraft and weapons were removed they could be redeployed in time of crisis, or other weapons systems might be substituted.

"Forward Basing

"With [REDACTED] our nuclear storage rights along [REDACTED]. (We also have weapons stored on Guam, but only the longer range B-52's can reach the [REDACTED].) Redeployment of the relatively small number of weapons [REDACTED] poses no great logistic problem. In terms of military capabilities, however, a significant consideration is the contraction of forward storage options. Our forward base structure [REDACTED] permits nuclear armed aircraft launched from these areas, together with carrier aircraft and strategic bombers from [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], and with strategic bombers from CONUS or sea-based missiles which might appear ambiguous [REDACTED].

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"If we were denied storage [redacted] (and our storage rights there have been subjected to increased uncertainty in the last few months), we would be left with [redacted] as forward nuclear weapon sites. The potential importance of [redacted] areas would then increase. The removal of nuclear weapons [redacted] under these circumstances would leave [redacted] for forward storage and would degrade our capability for tactical nuclear response in areas other than [redacted]. However, if reentry rights [redacted] were negotiated and if these were honored in a crisis, we could redeploy our weapons if a situation developed requiring such redeployments.

"Credibility

"To the extent they are known or are assumed to be present, our nuclear deployments [redacted] enhance the credibility, both to Allies and adversaries, of our capability and will to stand by our commitments. The visibility of these weapons and their associated quick reaction aircraft, [redacted] [redacted] are likely to have more specific meaning to [redacted] longer range B-52's on Guam or missile submarines in the Pacific. In addition, these weapons and aircraft contribute to our total posture of deterrence elsewhere in Asia. It should be recognized, however, that these weapons [redacted]. Nevertheless, their deterrent effect may not be diminished greatly inasmuch as [redacted] when other available US nuclear capabilities are considered.

"Possibility of Seizure

"Another consideration is the possible seizure of our weapons [redacted]. The US recently has taken steps to increase the physical security in our nuclear storage area at [redacted] and recent evaluations have concluded that the [redacted] is of a high order and tightly controlled and that an attempt at seizure of our weapons is remote except in the unlikely event that such a move was directed by the [redacted]. Moreover, all things considered [redacted]

[redacted] probably are every bit as secure from seizure as are our weapons in other foreign countries.

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[REDACTED] - US Policy

[REDACTED]

governments. It is clear, therefore, that the focus of our planning should be on the timing, conditions and order of withdrawal [REDACTED] [REDACTED] although we should not foreclose the possibility of a continued presence for an extended period of time if tensions in the area fail to diminish.

"Impact of Removal - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] our nuclear capability [REDACTED] provides visible evidence of our support. Regardless of the rationale used, [REDACTED] would view the removal of US nuclear weapons (and they would surely become quickly aware of it) as a severe blow, and as a significant manifestation of a weakening US commitment. This decision would be more upsetting to them, for example, than would the removal [REDACTED] support forces for the [REDACTED] as the latter are not related directly to the defense [REDACTED]. Nevertheless, eventual removal of the weapons is a step [REDACTED] may now foresee.

"There was no [REDACTED] reaction to several changes during the past year in the number of weapons in storage as opposed to their active interest in the redeployment of the [REDACTED]. In the latter instance, a reaction was not unexpected, since we notified [REDACTED] prior to the redeployment of these aircraft. No notice, of course, is given [REDACTED] of the nuclear weapon movements and we do not know how detailed their knowledge is of our weapon storage levels.

"It is likely that [REDACTED] interest in the aircraft stems from the relationship of [REDACTED] although it is most certainly understood that two aircraft on nuclear alert would not, by themselves, be decisive in preventing [REDACTED]. Nevertheless, it is probable that [REDACTED] sees the aircraft as representative of the full range of US support should [REDACTED] problem."

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"A further critical factor in terms of impact on [REDACTED] would be the advance notice provided before the weapons were removed. [REDACTED] has been, and probably will continue to be, very resilient in its ability to adapt to changes in the international environment. Given 12 to 18 months notice of an impending withdrawal, it would very probably be able to adapt both its domestic and foreign positions to such an eventuality.

Removal on short notice would, on the other hand, severely shake [REDACTED]. We should nevertheless consider that advance notice could increase the danger [REDACTED] action to prevent removal of the weapons.

[REDACTED]
"Over the years, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, the presence of nuclear weapons has not been emphasized [REDACTED] pronouncements. Thus, although [REDACTED] has made it clear that US military presence [REDACTED] of relations with the US, it is not clear from past history that the presence of nuclear weapons constitutes a particularly odious component of the US military presence. Rather, it is largely the physical presence of US forces and installations [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has frequently denounced the [REDACTED] specifically demanded that the US abandon that [REDACTED] seems to have assumed that the [REDACTED]

"The political impact [REDACTED] of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons [REDACTED] depends to some extent on other moves we may make in our force deployments [REDACTED] as a whole. [REDACTED] were apparently satisfied with US statements [REDACTED] concerning US force reductions because they established a trend toward an outcome preferred by [REDACTED] will probably react to future US action or inaction in terms of whether these reinforce or reverse movement toward that ultimate objective. We can probably anticipate a degree of [REDACTED] flexibility on timing; e.g., [REDACTED] are not pressing us to reduce forces [REDACTED] at a time when our [REDACTED] would rule out any significant reductions. When [REDACTED] permit, however, and particularly

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if a [REDACTED] would expect some significant reductions in forces not directly related to the defense [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] expect removal of such [REDACTED] units as the C-130 squadrons as a consequence of a [REDACTED] it is unlikely to be satisfied with this alone over a two to three year [REDACTED] period as evidence of US intentions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In this respect the nuclear weapons could play an important role. Their removal [REDACTED] a step [REDACTED] is likely to recognize quickly, might well constitute a sufficient supplement to [REDACTED] withdrawals to meet [REDACTED] minimum expectation that reductions be both public enough (C-130's) and substantial enough (nuclear weapons) to confirm that the trend [REDACTED] is continuing. However, one might consider using the withdrawal of nuclear weapons as either an explicit or implicit [REDACTED] action. In fulfilling our [REDACTED] the pros and cons of withdrawing nuclear weapons also will have to be weighed against those of the withdrawal of other units with substantial theater-support functions, i.e., communications and intelligence.

"Other Nations

"To the extent that removal of nuclear weapons [REDACTED] became known to other nations in the area, the political impact would probably be somewhat mixed. The assessment of our move would probably be less severe if it were obvious [REDACTED] had not been shocked by it. While welcome as a manifestation of further [REDACTED] the move would to some extent lessen the credibility of US commitments [REDACTED]. For example, [REDACTED] might be more difficult to deal with on the issue of nuclear storage in their country. Although contributing [REDACTED] uneasiness, there would probably be no significant impact [REDACTED] relationships or military arrangements. [REDACTED] while uneasy concerning the future military status [REDACTED] would probably not find it difficult to accept the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons [REDACTED] as long as it were not coupled to a wholesale US withdrawal [REDACTED] area."

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CHAPTER 20
DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATIONS
1973-1975

~~(TS)~~ The President approved, on 7 February 1973, the proposal that the SIOP-tasks ██████████ when aircraft availabilities permitted and desired to be informed of the contemplated timing for the return of these aircraft.

~~(TSFRD)~~ During a March 1973 security visit to some NATO installations, Senators Pastore and Baker questioned the storage of nuclear depth bombs ██████████. Specifically, their question dealt with possible usefulness versus apparent vulnerability. The Senators had been told that the U.S. Navy aircraft which would use these weapons were based at Jacksonville, Florida, and they questioned whether it might be more practical for these aircraft to fly with their own weapons rather than having them stored ██████████. They also questioned, in a broader sense, their difficulty in conceiving a wartime scenario whereby the Russians would allow slow propeller driven aircraft to search out their submarines in the water ██████████.

~~(TSFRD)~~ On 16 May 73, Deputy Secretary Clements informed Dr. Kissinger that worldwide ██████████ assets continued to be fully committed in Southeast Asia and he therefore could not present a definite date for resumption of the SIOP alert. He also stated that the requirement for SIOP alert ██████████ remained valid and that Dr. Kissinger would be advised when firm dates became available.

~~(TSFRD)~~ On 8 June 1973, Deputy Secretary Clements forwarded the request for approval of the FY 1974 nuclear weapons deployment plan. Specifically addressed in this memorandum were differences from the previous plan which were:

a. The authorization for NATO Europe would be decreased from ██████████ in FY 1973 to ██████████ in FY 1974. Detailed information included a net decrease in missiles deployed in West Germany on the Honest John/Sergeant swap for Lance and the reduction of tactical bombs ██████████ because of an uncertainty concerning the date that the unit would become operational and assume a nuclear role.

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b. Overall deployments in Westpac would increase from [redacted] in FY 1973 to [redacted] in FY 1974. Specifically, a reduction of [redacted] tactical bombs [redacted] in light of revised Westpac force projections, deployment [redacted] would remain at [redacted] tactical bombs for flexibility in the event of a crisis in Asia. Strategic bombs in Guam would increase by [redacted] mainly for smaller yield strategic bombs to be used in limited attack options and an increase of [redacted] nuclear depth bombs to improve Navy ASW flexibility.

c. Atlantic deployments would be reduced by [redacted] pending completion of detailed arrangements with the [redacted] storage.

d. Authorization of weapons afloat would increase from [redacted] in FY 1973 to [redacted] in FY 1974. This reflected the continued deployment of additional warheads in the new Poseidon missiles.

e. The proposed plan would authorize a total deployment of [redacted] weapons outside the United States at the end of FY 1974 as opposed to [redacted] at the end of FY 1973 and [redacted] for end FY 1972. The plan would also authorize the conditional deployment of up to [redacted] additional weapons outside the U.S. for various contingencies--an increase of [redacted] from FY 1973.

f. Secretary Laird's intention to extend PAL controls to all nuclear weapons on foreign soil [redacted]

~~(TSFRD)~~ The President approved the NWDCP for FY 1974 on 18 July 1973 (NSDM 226). He stipulated that deployments of 155mm projectiles for support of non-US NATO units would be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the authorization for these weapons with US forces in West Germany; that the Secretary of Defense would recommend whether ADM deployments in support of the program of cooperation be accompanied by corresponding increases in the total number of these weapons in NATO Europe; that PAL devices would continue to be installed in all weapons deployed to NATO Europe [redacted] that PALs would continue to be placed on all weapons deployed in [redacted] that PALs would be placed on all ASW weapons deployed [redacted] by the end of FY 74; and that replacement of tactical bombs deployed [redacted] with PAL-equipped bombs by the end of CY 1974 or as soon thereafter as procurement of such bombs permitted.

~~(TSFRD)~~ On 24 August 1973, the JCS requested a change in the deployment authority due to a security problem at [redacted] storage site. It was determined that, [redacted] the site was considered [redacted]

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vulnerable to intruders and dissidents. The JCS requested authority to deploy [redacted] ASW warheads from [redacted] on an interim basis while retaining deployment authority for the warheads [redacted]

~~(TSFRD)~~ On 27 September 1973, Secretary Schlesinger approved the JCS request and also requested that he be informed of recommendations concerning [redacted] when the worldwide security review was completed.

~~(TSFRD)~~ On 3 November 1973, Secretary Schlesinger replied to Senator Pastore concerning the [redacted] questions. He stated that the two basic reasons for forward-basing ASW weapons [redacted] were that the weapons must be prepositioned near the waters in which their use was anticipated and that they were for support of allied forces with whom we have appropriate programs of cooperation. Additional rationale to support these reasons follow. [redacted] and forward deployed US aircraft could make immediate use of the nuclear and nonnuclear weapons [redacted]. Patrol aircraft would deploy from the US with conventional loads and then onload nuclear ASW weapons at [redacted] if the situation escalated to nuclear operations. The site is the only peacetime storage site close to [redacted]

[redacted] The US/NATO forces fully expect to have air superiority and control of air spaces over this [redacted] fighter/interceptor squadrons based [redacted] and USAF fighter/interceptor squadrons based [redacted] would provide air control and ASW unit protection.

~~(TSFRD)~~ On 20 June 1974, the President, by NSDM 258, approved the request of the Secretary of Defense to change the nuclear weapon yield constraint imposed by NSAM 143 and modified by NSAM 199. The yield provisions were amended to accommodate B61-2 and B61-3 tactical nuclear bomb support of non-US NATO forces. The yield of bombs provided to non-US NATO forces shall not exceed [redacted] KT.

~~(TSFRD)~~ On the same day, the President approved in principle the programs of cooperation [redacted] the Federal Republic of Germany to develop and support B43, B57 and B61-2/B61-3 nuclear bomb delivery capabilities with the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA). The President also approved in principle programs of cooperation which would add B61-2/B61-3 nuclear bomb support to those existing programs [redacted] the Federal Republic of Germany. [redacted] already supported with the B28, B43 and B57 nuclear bombs.

~~(SFRD)~~ All weapons were removed [redacted] on 18 July 1974.

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(~~SEED~~) The JCS notified the Secretary of Defense on 7 October 1974 that their examination of the deployment posture at [REDACTED] reaffirmed the military justification for forward-deployed nuclear ASW weapons [REDACTED] and recommended that all such weapons be consolidated [REDACTED]. The JCS rationale was presented as follows:

- a. [REDACTED] had been noncontroversial from a political and security standpoint and was located in proximity to the area of operations. Ample storage space was available for the additional weapons.
- b. [REDACTED] of the weapons were earmarked for [REDACTED] use and the consolidation would only involve an intracountry move.
- c. If [REDACTED] was maintained in a contingency status, B57s could be airlifted from [REDACTED] and returned to the site by the time delivery aircraft arrived. It could also be utilized as a divert field.
- d. [REDACTED] could absorb the increased inventory without increasing the number of support and security personnel. All of the US security forces at [REDACTED] could be reassigned. Some weapons technicians would still be required at [REDACTED] to maintain security and support equipment.

(~~TSPRD~~) The next day, the President approved the NWDCP for FY 1975 (NSDM 274). He stipulated that actual deployments against the authorizations would be controlled by the Secretary of Defense and be in accordance with Public Law 93-365 (the Nunn Amendment); deployments of 155mm projectiles for support of non-US NATO units would be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the authorization for these weapons with US forces in West Germany; that the Secretary of Defense recommend at an appropriate time whether ADM deployments in support of the program of cooperation be accompanied by corresponding increases in the total number of these weapons in NATO Europe; and that deployment of [REDACTED] tactical bombs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ASW warheads to [REDACTED] Guam under conditions of advanced readiness be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the authorization for these weapons in Guam. He also approved retaining excess Honest John and Sergeant warheads in-theater but directed that they be identified as special deployments rather than included under the authority for unforeseen crises. He stated that except as necessary to comply with the provisions of Public Law 93-365, these warheads would remain in-theater unless their redeployment was approved by the President. The President further directed that his approval be obtained before removing weapons from

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[REDACTED] that yield restrictions of NSAM 143 as modified by NSAMs 197 and 370 and NSDM 258 continue to apply; that PAL devices continue to be maintained on all weapons deployed to NATO Europe, [REDACTED] and on all PAL-equipped weapons [REDACTED]; that those weapons [REDACTED] without PAL devices be replaced with PAL-equipped weapons by the end of FY 1976; that deployment of weapons to [REDACTED] be held in abeyance pending further review; and that any plan to deploy weapons to [REDACTED] be submitted to him for approval. The President additionally desired that future annual deployment authorization requests include plans for two fiscal years.

(~~TSFRD~~) During December 1974, all non-PAL weapons were removed from [REDACTED] and only [REDACTED] tactical bombs remained at [REDACTED]

(U) The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished on January 19, 1975, and reestablished as the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). The AEC's Division of Regulation became the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the same date.

(~~TSFRD~~) On 20 January 1975, the Secretary of Defense was briefed on the FY76-77 Deployment Authorization Plan. The Secretary decided upon the removal of all nuclear weapons from [REDACTED] by early FY 76 but authorized conditional deployments as follows:

- a. Up to [REDACTED] tactical nuclear bombs for advanced readiness.
- b. Up to [REDACTED] tactical nuclear bombs for temporary offload of ships when required for emergency reasons.
- c. Up to [REDACTED] AAW/ASW for temporary offload of ships when required for emergency reasons and for advanced readiness of ASW operations ([REDACTED] warheads).

(~~SPRD~~) At the same time, the Secretary of Defense deferred a decision on the [REDACTED] issue until Navy studies addressing the rationale and inventory needs for AAW and ASW weapons had been completed.

(~~TSFRD~~) On 16 April 1975, the Secretary of Defense submitted the FY 1976 and FY 1977 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan to the President. It was noted that the plan incorporated many changes resulting from a rigorous internal reexamination of deployments in the context of revised military planning, the restructuring and modernization of military forces, the Nunn Amendment (PL 93-365) and ongoing MBFR negotiations. Therefore, the

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FY 76-77 authorization request for Europe was set at the ceiling established by PL 93-365 of [REDACTED] weapons. Identification of possible weapons reduction of [REDACTED] for FY 76 in Europe, which included [REDACTED] for Option III in MBR and an additional [REDACTED] in FY 77 to account for reduced military requirements, were addressed with the objective of reaching levels in Europe of [REDACTED] in FY 76 and [REDACTED] in FY 77. The proposed reductions were based on:

- a. Replacement of Honest John and Sergeant with the more survivable and flexible Lance SSM on a less than one-for-one basis.
- b. Replacement of some fixed yield bombs with selectable yield bombs which were more suitable to the European environment.
- c. Readjustment of load factors of nuclear air defense weapons to have more nonnuclear missiles on alert.
- d. Withdrawal to CONUS of those weapons intended for dual-based forces and some of the less critical weapons held in reserve by the theater commander for battlefield use.
- e. Overall deployments in Westpac would decrease from [REDACTED] in FY 75 to [REDACTED] in FY 76 and [REDACTED] in FY 77.
- f. Atlantic deployments would be reduced from [REDACTED] in FY 75 to [REDACTED] in FY 76 and FY 77.
- g. Authorizations of weapons afloat would decrease from [REDACTED] in FY 75 to [REDACTED] in FY 76 but increase slightly in FY 77 to [REDACTED]
- h. The proposed plan would authorize a total deployment of [REDACTED] in FY 76 and [REDACTED] in FY 77.

(S) On April 30, 1975, the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in a memorandum to the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense stated that the President had directed that, until further notice, there will be no withdrawal of United States forces or nuclear weapons from overseas areas without his expressed approval.

(TSFRD) In accordance with General Wickham's request for a list of the Force Actions and Nuclear Actions that were immediately affected by General Scowcroft's April 30 memorandum, the ATSD(AE) on May 9, submitted the following information to the ASD(ISA) for incorporation into an information memorandum to the Secretary of Defense:

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"a. Guam

-Action. In accordance with the Presidentially approved FY 75 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization and FY 75-77 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, [REDACTED] HONEST JOHN warheads and [REDACTED] MADM are to be returned to CONUS by end FY 75 for retirement.

-Impact. No operational impact. Retention in Guam post FY 75 would require an administrative change to the FY 75-77 stockpile. ERDA's retirement schedule could be affected.

-Recommendation. We should continue with this move or seek Presidential approval to extend these deployments.

"b. [REDACTED]

-Action. It had been planned to withdraw all [REDACTED] remaining tactical nuclear bombs from [REDACTED] by early FY 76, upon Presidential approval of FY 76-77 Deployment Plan. Significant cost savings would accrue.

-Impact. Short-term delay would have negligible effect. Long-term delay or a Presidential requirement to retain nuclear weapons at [REDACTED] would require major security improvements (approximately \$1 million construction costs) and continued O&M. CINCPAC has no operational requirement for these weapons past FY 75.

-Recommendation. Short-term delay has a negligible financial effect and no movement is planned pending Presidential approval of the FY 76-77 Deployment Plan. We recommend withdrawal in FY 76 upon Presidential approval.

"c. FRG

-Action. [REDACTED] PERSHING warheads are currently scheduled for return to CONUS by end FY 75 for retirement.

-Impact. No operational impact. Stockpile authorization change required.

-Recommendation. We should place these warheads in the Special Deployment authorization for possible use in MBFR negotiations.

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"d. [REDACTED]

-Action. [REDACTED] high-yield tactical bombs, excess to USCINCEUR's needs, were to be returned to CONUS. Action currently on a hold due to political sensitivities.

-Impact. None.

-Recommendation. No movement until Presidential approval of FY 76-77 Deployment Plan and consultation with USCINCEUR.

"e. Alaska

-Action. [REDACTED] tactical bombs, [REDACTED] 155mm AFAPs, and [REDACTED] NIKE HERCULES warheads are to be returned to CONUS for storage by end FY 75.

-Impact. Removal of these weapons from Alaska would achieve cost and manpower savings and eliminate certain security problems.

-Recommendation. These weapons are not listed in the Deployment Plan as an overseas deployment. This should therefore be accomplished and treated as a CONUS move."

(SPO) On May 23, 1975, General Scowcroft notified General Wickham that his verbal request to remove [REDACTED] older theater nuclear weapons from Guam for retirement had been approved.

(S) General Scowcroft notified the Secretary of Defense on 30 June 1975 that the President had authorized continuation of the FY 75 deployments pending his decision on the FY 76 plan.

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CHAPTER 21

DEVELOPMENTS AND DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATIONS
1975-1977

(~~TS FRD~~) On 16 July 1975, NSDM 300 was issued which gave Presidential approval to the FY 76 and FY 77 deployment plan. Approved ceilings were: [REDACTED] for Western Europe; [REDACTED] for the Atlantic; [REDACTED] for the Pacific; [REDACTED] afloat for FY 76 and [REDACTED] afloat for FY 77. Authorizations for [REDACTED] would remain at the current levels. Approval of the SACEUR Reserve concept was withheld pending receipt and review of an analysis of its political and military implications. MBFR excess in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) would be retained. The President also requested rationale for the proposed reductions and revised deployment tables reflecting this NSDM decision.

(U) The Secretary of Defense forwarded the rationale and revised deployment tables to the President on 1 August 1975.

(~~S FRD~~) In a message to USCINCEUR dated 15 August 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the conditional deployment of [REDACTED] Lance warheads [REDACTED]

(~~S FRD~~) On 16 August 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a message, directed that planning be initiated to consolidate ASW nuclear weapons from [REDACTED]

(~~TS FRD~~) By memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated 10 September 1975, the ATSD(AE) outlined the rationale for reductions in the numbers of forward deployed nuclear weapons that were identified based on military requirements, peacetime security of these weapons and economic considerations. The general rationale presented was as follows:

-- Pacific.

o (~~TS FRD~~) Remove the remaining [REDACTED] nuclear weapons from [REDACTED] but retain the storage facilities for contingency redeployments. There is no longer a requirement for these tactical bombs in a SIOP role. Strategic assets have assumed the role previously held by these land-based tactical bombs. Carrier nuclear forces are available to provide a backup capability.

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o (~~S FRD~~) Reduce the authorization of nuclear weapons
[redacted] from the current [redacted] to [redacted].

- Air delivered nuclear bomb requirements have been reduced from [redacted] to [redacted] as CINCPAC no longer maintained a SIOP commitment.

- Reduce Army weapons from [redacted] to [redacted] by deleting all [redacted] atomic demolition munitions (ADM), reducing tactical missile warheads ([redacted] Honest John to [redacted] and [redacted] Sergeant to [redacted] reducing [redacted] Nike Hercules nuclear warheads to [redacted] and reducing artillery nuclear rounds from [redacted] to [redacted].

-- NATO.

(~~S FRD~~) Reduce a limited number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe outside the NATO Guidelines Area (no MBFR implications) as follows:

o Eventually remove all nuclear air defense weapons from [redacted]. Nuclear warheads [redacted] were demated and replaced with conventional rounds during [redacted]. They continue to be held in storage thus requiring US custodial and [redacted] security forces.

o The nuclear storage sites in [redacted] are believed by many in Congress to be vulnerable to overrun in a war or takeover in a coup. Aside from this political pressure, it was recognized that their military utility, in the current deployment posture was questionable.

o Remove from [redacted] B43 bombs that are no longer in SACEUR's Strike Plans plus [redacted] other bombs that were designated for restrike or replacement of losses. These weapons were solely in support of US forces and had no Program of Cooperation implications. This action would reduce bombs for US forces from [redacted] to [redacted] bombs would remain [redacted]. Air Force requirements under SACEUR's strike plans.

-- [redacted]

o (~~S FRD~~) Remove [redacted] nuclear depth bombs stored ashore [redacted]. The Chairman JCS supported a Secretary of Defense decision

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that these could be redeployed to CONUS. They were retained in country for possible use as bargaining chips in [REDACTED] rights negotiations and their removal would be part of the final package upon completion of these negotiations.

-- United Kingdom. (S FRD) The British had been informed of the Secretary of Defense direction to consolidate [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with other weapons at [REDACTED]. This consolidation was not affected by the NSDM 300 freeze.

(~~S FRD~~) The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed, by a 13 November 1975 message, execution of consolidation plans to relocate the ASW weapons from [REDACTED]

(~~TS FRD~~) By JCSM-422-75, dated 4 December 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their proposed FY 1977 and FY 1978 Nuclear Weapon Deployment Plan to the Secretary of Defense. The proposed deployment levels were:

	<u>Authorized</u>		<u>Proposed</u>	
	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
Europe	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Atlantic	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Pacific	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Afloat	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
TOTAL	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Note: Proposed levels resulted from a JCS reevaluation of deployments based on the posture necessary to support operational requirements in the context of "today's environment." MBFR Option III, reconsideration of Nike Hercules reductions [REDACTED] and significant reductions within NATO were also addressed.

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(~~S FRD~~) The USCINCEUR, by JCS message, was requested to complete a study on a proposed reduction of nuclear warheads for Nike Hercules [REDACTED]. Options of this study were to encompass the following:

- a. No reduction in Nike Hercules warhead deployments.
- b. Twenty- five, 50, and 75 percent reductions in nuclear capable batteries per battalion equivalent with the batteries affected retaining conventional posture.
- c. Twenty, 50, and 80 percent reductions in nuclear loading factor per nuclear capable Nike Hercules battery.

(~~S FRD~~) In a 16 December 1975 memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff, the ATSD(AE) authorized removal of [REDACTED] remaining Honest John warheads [REDACTED]. This action was authorized since the NSC staff had determined that modernization programs having no effect on MBFR negotiations were not subject to the "freeze" indicated by NSDM 300 and could therefore be completed.

(~~S FRD~~) USCINCEUR replied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 December 1975 regarding the Nike Hercules review. The reply referred to a SACEUR assessment which presented no information indicating military justification for introducing gaps by completely withdrawing the Nike Hercules system, eliminating the nuclear component, or thinning out the system. The SACEUR study indicates that a reduction to a standard load of ten warheads per US battery might be acceptable although the adjustment could create some element of risk. The main concern was that political reaction to US unilateral reduction could be counterproductive in the current modernization dialogue and would be viewed as a clear sign of weakening US resolve in the face of economic pressures.

(U) In January 1976, it was decided that the FY 1977/78 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan would be forwarded to the Defense Review Panel (DRP) Working Group for discussion.

(~~TS FRD~~) By JCSM 20-76 dated 19 January 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their site-by-site review of nuclear weapons storage sites, identified candidate sites for consolidation and closure and provided related information on personnel requirements relating to the storage sites in NATO Europe. The proposed reductions are

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summarized as follows:

	<u>1 Jan 75</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Proposed</u>
CONUS			
Alaska			
Hawaii			
Guam			
Puerto Rico			
SUBTOTAL			
SUBTOTAL			
FRG			
United Kingdom			
SUBTOTAL			
SUBTOTAL			
TOTALS			

*Includes 48 Nike Hercules sites in central Europe.

(S) On 27 January 1976, Presidential Advisor Scowcroft informed the Secretary of Defense that the President had approved an additional Poseidon reentry vehicles for

(U) A proposed deployment plan package was forwarded to OASD(ISA) on 4 February 1976 with the request that it be furnished to the DRP working group. The ATSD(AE) also requested discussions at the

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working group level after February 18 with a meeting of the principals in either late February or early March 1976.

(U) On March 22, 1976, the FY 1977/1978 Plan was transmitted by the NSC staff to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requesting final agency concurrence.

(U) Department of Defense concurrence was forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on 5 April 1976 by the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

~~(S FRD)~~ By JCSM-127-76, dated 5 April 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that Presidential approval be sought to remove the [REDACTED] ASW weapons stored [REDACTED]. The rationale for this request was that there were indications that a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would be ratified prior to completion of US/UK negotiations on increasing storage at [REDACTED]. If these weapons were not removed prior to ratification, [REDACTED] would have legitimate cause for complaint.

~~(S)~~ The Deputy ATSD(AE) provided an interim reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 April 1976 concerning site consolidation. He reaffirmed that NATO site closures were dependent upon consultation, which he noted had been slow; that OSD M&RA and PA&E, as well as ATSD(AE) and JCS, had been working since November 1975 on the problem. He informed the JCS that site consolidation issues had previously been addressed in the April 1975 "Nunn Report" and the 19 December 1975 study, "Improving the Effectiveness of NATO's Theater Nuclear Forces." He further stated that it was being recommended that the Secretary of Defense address this issue at the 19th Nuclear Planning Group meeting in June 1976.

~~(S FRD)~~ In a memorandum to the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense dated 3 May 1976, the Deputy ATSD(AE) provided a point paper on proposed reductions [REDACTED]. The points made were:

-- The FY 1977-1978 Deployment Plan proposed that, from a total of [REDACTED] nuclear weapons then authorized [REDACTED] weapons be incrementally withdrawn, leaving [REDACTED] warheads at the end of FY 1977. Types to be withdrawn would include nuclear artillery, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, atomic demolition munitions, and tactical bombs.

-- The rationale presented for this withdrawal was:

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o From a military viewpoint, an approximate balance existed between opposing forces [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not anticipated; that aircraft [REDACTED] were no longer SIOP committed; that greater operational emphasis should be made on integrating strategic, tactical, land and sea based systems similar to that occurring in NATO; that withdrawal of some of the older, more obsolete systems, e. g., Sergeant and Honest John, would be permitted; Nike Hercules (conventional only) was being transferred to [REDACTED] and that the capability existed for a rapid insertion of additional nuclear weapons, e. g., airlift from Guam, if necessary.

o Political considerations were congressional concern over the large number of forward deployed nuclear weapons worldwide and the threat of international terrorism or host-country takeover; weapons were for employment by US forces only; [REDACTED] did not know the quantity of nuclear weapons; that the nuclear weapons being reduced were not the more visible delivery systems; and that movement of weapons can occur on an incremental basis without [REDACTED] knowledge of the extent of transfer.

(~~TS- FPD~~) By National Security Decision Memorandum 328 dated 4 May 1976, National Security Advisor Scowcroft notified the Secretary of Defense that the President had approved modifications of the US

[REDACTED] The modifications would provide improved survivability of the forces committed to the General Strike Plan and allow for some reduction in tactical aircraft requirements for targeting against fixed targets in the GSP, thus making such aircraft fully available for other theater operations. Specifically, the United States:

-- [REDACTED]

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-- Would carry the [REDACTED], as appropriate, whether located in CINCLANT's or USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.

(S FRD) On May 25, 1976, the President's National Security Advisor forwarded the FY 1977/1978 Deployment Plan to the NSC Defense Review Panel with the recommendation that it be forwarded to the President without an NSC meeting; and that there had been general agreement that it would be inadvisable to withdraw weapons from [REDACTED] that time.

(S FRD) In a 7 June 1976 memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff, the Deputy ATSD(AE) authorized the JCS to store afloat or at a temporary location in CONUS the [REDACTED] ASW weapons then stored [REDACTED]. The Joint Staff was also informed that the actual relocation date would not exceed beyond a reasonable time (2 to 4 weeks) after [REDACTED] entered into force and that the United Kingdom would restrict movements during the tourist season thereby precluding consolidation at [REDACTED] until after September 1976.

(S FRD) In a message on 21 June 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the removal of the [REDACTED] depth bombs from [REDACTED] temporary storage afloat. The message also stated that [REDACTED] SAS site would be maintained as a contingency site to support ASW operations under advanced readiness conditions.

(TS FRD) The President approved the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization Plan for FY 1977 and FY 1978 by National Security Decision Memorandum 332, dated 7 July 1976, which also extended the FY 1976 deployment authority of NSDM 300 through the FY 1976 transition quarter. Authorized deployment levels by region and afloat were:

	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
Europe	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Atlantic	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Pacific	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Afloat	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

In addition, the following restrictions were enumerated:

-- All nuclear weapons deployed [REDACTED] would be removed.

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-- All nuclear weapons deployed to NATO Europe, [REDACTED] would have Permissive Action Link (PAL) devices installed.

-- Reductions in [REDACTED] would be accomplished in coordination with the Department of State.

-- Prior to the initial weapons withdrawal [REDACTED] the Department of State would be informed.

-- The special deployment category for MBFR would be retained.

(~~S~~ FRD) On 19 July 1976, all weapons stored at [REDACTED] were removed without incident.

(~~TS~~ FRD) In a guidance memorandum dated 21 July 1976 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to the FY 1977/FY 1978 deployment plan, the Secretary of Defense directed an early coordinated effort to withdraw an initial [REDACTED] nuclear weapons from [REDACTED]

(~~TS~~ FRD) The ATSD(AE) was advised by the Vice Director, Joint Staff, on 28 September 1976, that the CINCPAC plan for [REDACTED] re-deployment was then under development, that a 1 December 1976 sealift movement would be cost effective, and requested that coordination be obtained from the State Department.

(~~TS~~ FRD) On 1 October 1976, Department of State concurrence was requested for the removal of [REDACTED] weapons by sealift from [REDACTED] in a letter to the Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from the Deputy ATSD(AE).

(~~TS~~ FRD) The Secretary of Defense concurred in the closing of 23 storage sites in his memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 November 1976. Additional guidance from the Secretary is briefly stated herewith. Further reductions in NATO sites might be possible following NATO discussions on possible thinning of nuclear capable Nike Hercules. MBFR Option III and CINCEUR/SACEUR Deployable Reserve would be held in abeyance pending outcome of ongoing negotiations and future decisions. Action should be initiated, however, to effect closure of the sites at Concord and Seal Beach, California; Barbers Point and Lualualie, Hawaii; and [REDACTED] in the time frame specified by JCSM-20-76. [REDACTED] would be retained to support deployment levels specified in

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NSDM 332. The site at [REDACTED] would not be closed until ongoing negotiations with [REDACTED] were completed.

(S ~~FRD~~) At the same time, the Secretary of Defense transmitted a message to SACEUR requesting his personal views of the NATO site consolidations in JCSM-20-76 as well as the one at [REDACTED] FRG, supporting US forces in Europe. He also requested SACEUR's views on the feasibility of further consolidation/closures in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S ~~FRD~~) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a 7 December 1976 message, notified concerned commands of the Secretary's 10 November 1976 site closure decisions. Closure of the [REDACTED] site would be dependent upon a reduction of tactical bomb deployment authorizations allowing proper storage of all tactical bombs at [REDACTED]

(TS) On 18 December 1976, the Secretary of Defense was informed by a memorandum from National Security Advisor Scowcroft that the President had decided to delay the planned withdrawal of the Sergeant Missile Battalion, including its warheads, equipment, and troops [REDACTED] until further notice.

(TS ~~FRD~~) On 3 January 1977, the ATSD(AE) informed the Director, Joint Staff, of the President's decision to delay withdrawal of the Sergeant missile battalion [REDACTED]. Therefore, the Sergeant warheads scheduled for withdrawal at that time would be retained for the present.

(S) In a letter to General Haig, dated 17 January 1977, the Secretary of Defense suggested delaying the closure of seven Central Region SAS sites originally identified by the JCS. He also suggested that it might be timely to examine the entire site consolidation issue in light of the current maldeployments in the Central Region and in consideration of the survivability and security of nuclear weapons currently deployed as well as those to be deployed as part of the theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization program. The Secretary also agreed that [REDACTED] weapons redeployment proposals, due to site security vulnerabilities, be delayed due to political sensitivities.

(TS ~~FRD~~) On 17 February 1977, the Deputy ATSD(AE) informed the Director, Joint Staff that the State Department had agreed to the withdrawal of all remaining nuclear weapons from [REDACTED]

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on or about 1 March 1977.

(S ERD) General Haig, by a 25 February 1977 letter to Secretary Brown, acknowledged former Secretary Rumsfeld's 17 January letter and informed the new Secretary that development of the terms of reference as well as the US position for a storage site assessment to determine optimum storage locations in the Central Region [REDACTED] were underway. He also stated that, upon completion of this effort and if politically opportune, separate requests would be made to the governments of [REDACTED] to discuss possible site restructuring within those countries.

(S ERD) On 1 March 1977, the Deputy ATSD(AE) forwarded a proposed FY 1977-1978 Deployment Plan change to the State Department requesting their concurrence. The change was being made partly due to delays in ERDA's delivery of B61 bombs due to past funding problems and partly due to SACEUR's desire to retain a yield spectrum including the [REDACTED] currently provided by the B57. The result of this action would change the overall deployment authorizations in Europe to [REDACTED] for FY 1977 (+ [REDACTED]) and remain at the [REDACTED] figure for FY 78 (+ [REDACTED]).

(TS FRD) Also on 1 March 1977, the Director, Joint Staff informed the ATSD(AE) that CINCPAC had scheduled a 7 March airlift to withdraw the remaining weapons from [REDACTED] and requested that the State Department be informed of the schedule withdrawal date.

(U) The State Department was informed of the Joint Staff request by ATSD(AE) letter of 2 March 1977.

(TS ERD) The United States Ambassador to [REDACTED] objected to the 7 March withdrawal date due to political considerations. Therefore, as a result of a 4 March ATSD(AE) request, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the 7 March mission should be cancelled and that it would be rescheduled at a later date.

(U) The State Department concurred in the proposed European deployment changes in a 4 March 1977 letter to the ATSD(AE).

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(U) The Secretary of Defense requested the change to the approved FY 1977-1978 Deployment Authorization in a memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on 18 March 1977.

(~~SFRD~~) The FY 1977-1978 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization reflected a reduction of [redacted] bombs in support of US forces in [redacted] [redacted] had been removed in 1975 and the remaining [redacted] were scheduled for removal during FY 1977. The State Department disagreed with the proposed withdrawal stating that such a decision should be deferred until Congress considered the proposed [redacted] Defense Cooperation Agreement and its status on Capitol Hill became clearer. As a result, the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense informed the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on 26 March 1977 that the withdrawal of the [redacted] bombs would be held in abeyance.

(~~SFRD~~) Approval was given on 31 March 1977 to change the FY 1977 and FY 1978 deployment authorization reflecting the delayed B61 delivery in support of non-US NATO squadrons. The Director, Joint Staff was notified of this approval by a Deputy ATSD(AE) memorandum dated 20 April 1977.

(~~TSEFRD~~) On 14 April 1977, State concurrence was again received to withdraw the remaining weapons from [redacted]. The Deputy ATSD(AE) informed the Director, Joint Staff of this concurrence on the same day.

(~~TSEFRD~~) The Director, Joint Staff informed the ATSD(AE) on 26 April 1977 that all nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from [redacted] by airlift on 23 April 1977 as scheduled. The Deputy ATSD(AE) provided confirmation of this to the State Department on 27 April 1977.

(~~SFRD~~) As a result of the decision to reduce forces and nuclear weapons [redacted] the Chairman, JCS requested Secretary of Defense approval, on 14 July 1977, to initiate withdrawal of weapons by removing [redacted] tactical bombs by 31 October 1977. This action would permit consolidation of the remaining air-delivered weapons [redacted] and closure of the [redacted] site. The Chairman also stated that the remaining [redacted] bombs would be withdrawn during the January-June 1980 time period.

(~~SFRD~~) The Secretary of Defense approved the JCS request to withdraw the initial [redacted] tactical bombs from [redacted] provided such drawdown commenced after 26 July 1977 which was the established date of the security consultative meeting.

(~~SFRD~~) In an 11 August 1977 message, the JCS approved the withdrawal of [redacted] bombs from [redacted] and their subsequent relocation to [redacted] United Kingdom. This action was a previously approved conditional weapons deployment to support deployment of [redacted] to the United Kingdom.

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(SFRD) The Chairman, JCS informed the Secretary of Defense on 22 August 1977, that, based on FY 1977 deployment authorizations, [redacted] ground force weapons were being withdrawn [redacted] prior to 1 October 1977. The Chairman also requested approval to withdraw the remaining 114 ground force weapons during October-December 1977. The Secretary of Defense approved this proposal on 23 August 1977.

(TSFRD) The ATSD(AE) forwarded the proposed FY 1978-1979 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan to the Secretary of Defense on 9 September 1977. Major features addressed in this plan called for:

-- Maintaining the current warhead levels in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) to protect the [redacted] warhead offer under Option III of MBFR.

-- Requesting approval in principle to initiate a supplemental plan to replace excess Honest John warheads in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) (expected to be in excess of [redacted] warheads by end FY '78), for which delivery systems were not available, by more operationally useful weapons to the extent such warheads were available. This would not only improve the current NATO military posture, but could also enhance the negotiating value of the [redacted] warhead offer in MBFR Option III. Prior notification of the NATO allies to inform them of this approach would be desirable.

-- Loading of all eight US Lance units with [redacted] warheads pending future main missile purchase by the FRG. The plan contained conditional deployments for the FRG should additional main missile purchases be made and would be drawn in equal amounts from warheads for conditional deployments in support of US units. The deployment of an enhanced radiation warhead for Lance would not be required to meet the deployment levels in this plan. Assuming approval by the President for production of this warhead, however, their subsequent deployment to NATO was envisioned.

-- Retaining Nike Hercules warheads in the FRG pending settlement of details regarding thinning out of nuclear Nike Hercules. Adjustments for Nike Hercules could be integrated into the supplemental plan for dealing with the excess Honest Johns if appropriate.

-- Withdrawal of warheads [redacted] in accordance with the DoD plan submitted in response to PD/NSC 12. A reduction of nearly 55 percent ([redacted] warheads including [redacted] air-delivered weapons) by end FY 1978 and an additional [redacted] warheads withdrawn in FY 1979 would leave [redacted] air-delivered weapons scheduled for removal in FY 1980.

-- Withdrawal of all Army warheads [redacted] from Guam. The limited benefit of retaining these weapons forward deployed while the delivery forces were being withdrawn to CONUS would not be offset by the cost of improving and maintaining storage facilities in Guam. [redacted]

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Marine weapons would be left which could cover Army contingencies and [REDACTED] SAC weapons would remain at Anderson AFB.

(~~SEPD~~) The Director, Joint Staff informed the ATSD(AE) on 9 September 1977 that, due to the collocation of the [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] support weapons were also consolidated reducing the number of storage sites [REDACTED] from 11 to 10.

(U) The Secretary approved the FY 1978-1979 plan on 10 September except for some conditional deployment authorization requests.

(~~SEPD~~) Following this approval, the ATSD(AE) forwarded the revised plan to State on 14 September 1977 requesting departmental concurrence.

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SUMMATION

(SFRD) Over the years, the custody of nuclear weapons has shifted from [redacted] percent AEC (ERDA) control in 1950 to [redacted] percent control by the Defense Department. The table below shows deployments and stockpile totals for the initial year, peak year and end fiscal year 1977.

TABLE XIII
US DEPLOYMENTS AND STOCKPILE FOR
INITIAL, PEAK AND END FISCAL YEAR 1977 YEARS

	<u>Initial (Year)</u>	<u>Peak (Year)</u>	<u>End FY 1977</u>
Total Deployed	[redacted] (1951)	[redacted] (1967)	[redacted]
NATO Europe Support	[redacted] (1960)	[redacted] (1971)	[redacted]
Pacific Support	[redacted] (1951)	[redacted] (1967)	[redacted]
Total Stockpile	13 (1947)	31,723 (1967)	[redacted]

(U) Detailed figures are illustrated in the appendices. Graphic illustrations plot these figures in the tables following this page.


<u>Table</u>	<u>Illustration</u>
XIV	Total stockpile from 1947 through 30 September 1977.
XV	NATO Europe deployments from 1954 through 30 September 1977 showing total, non-US support and US support.
XVa	Central Region NATO Europe total from 1961 through 30 September 1977.
XVb	[redacted] NATO Europe total from 1961 through 30 September 1977.
XVI	Pacific ashore deployments from 1961 through 30 September 1977 showing total and country totals.
XVII	Atlantic ashore deployments from 1961 through 30 September 1977 showing total and country totals.
XVIII	Afloat deployments from 1961 through 30 September 1977 showing total and area totals.

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TABLE XIV

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TOTAL STOCKPILE (BY FISCAL YEAR)



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
Unauthorized disclosure is subject to Administrative sanctions and may constitute a crime as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissem. Section 144.b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954.

TABLE XV

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DEPLOYMENTS IN NATO EUROPE END FISCAL YEAR TOTALS

NUMBER OF
WEAPONS



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
TABLE XVa

~~SECRET-FRD~~

NATO EUROPE DEPLOYMENTS CENTRAL REGION

~~FRG, UNITED KINGDOM)~~

NUMBER OF
WEAPONS



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EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
11652, FEBRUARY 18, 1976, AND
SECTION 1.44.D, ARJ, 1054.

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
TABLE XVb

~~SECRET-FRD~~

NATO EUROPE DEPLOYMENTS



NUMBER OF WEAPONS



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
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TABLE XVI

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PACIFIC ASHORE DEPLOYMENTS

END FISCAL YEAR TOTALS



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
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TABLE XVII

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ATLANTIC ASHORE DEPLOYMENTS END FISCAL YEAR TOTAL



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
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TABLE XVIII

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AFLOAT DEPLOYMENTS END FISCAL YEARS



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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Atomic Energy Act of 1946
Assigned all organizations and properties of the Manhattan Project to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
2. Executive Order 9816 31 Dec 1946
Implemented the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. It stated that all fissionable material and all atomic weapons and parts remaining from the Manhattan Project would be transferred to the AEC. It further provided that AEC could deliver fissionable material or weapons to the Armed Forces in the interests of National Defense at the direction of the President.
3. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Established 1 Jan 1947
AFSWP ordered to assume responsibility for all military service functions of the Manhattan Project "as are retained under control of the Armed Forces." Included was the mission to participate in weapons development in coordination with the AEC.
4. Letter from Secretary of War to Chairman, AEC 30 Dec 1946
In connection with discussion concerning storage bases the letter states in part "I anticipate that when the matter has been reviewed by the President, he will direct that a certain number of bombs and bomb parts will be wholly within the custody of the armed services which are charged with the national defense."
5. Joint AEC-MLC Meetings Dec 1946; Aug 1947
At both meetings the MLC informally indicated the desirability of transferring custody of stockpile weapons to the Department of Defense. No decisions reached.
6. Memorandum for Secretaries of War and Navy 4 Sep 1947
"Delivery of Atomic Weapons to the Armed Forces"
Military Liaison Committee recommends that all atomic weapons when ready for stockpile be delivered to the Armed Forces; that the AFSWP assume custody of weapons so delivered and assume responsibility for storage and surveillance with technical assistance from the AEC.

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7. Memoranda for Chairman, MLC

from Secretary of Navy	18 Sep 1947
from Chief of Staff, U. S. Army	16 Oct 1947
from Chief of Staff, U. S., Air Force	31 Oct 1947

All indicate general concurrence with MLC proposals of 4 September 1947 and request formal views of AEC.

8. Letter to Chairman, AEC, from Chairman, MLC 12 Nov 1947

Transmits views, as expressed in memoranda listed above, on desirability of transfer of custody. Requests formal views of AEC. No formal reply received.

9. Memorandum to Chairman, AEC, from Chairman, MLC 16 Dec 1947

Transmits copies of correspondence between MLC and the three Departments regarding delivery of atomic weapons to the Armed Forces. Incloses also a presentation of the views of the MLC.

10. Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from Chairman, MLC 11 Mar 1948

Incloses AEC staff study on technical considerations together with a summary of MLC views. MLC recommends that "the Secretary of Defense recommend to the President that the responsibility for stockpile and surveillance of atomic weapons, with necessary assistance from the AEC, be assigned to the Armed Forces without delay."

11. Joint AEC-MLC Meeting at Sandia Base 26-27 May 1948

A statement of points of understanding was prepared in preliminary fashion for further consideration at a subsequent meeting.

12. Memorandum to Chairman, AEC, from Chairman, MLC 14 Jun 1948

Proposes transfer of custody, urging that AEC join the Secretary of Defense in recommending to the President the transfer of custody and submitting a draft of a proposed letter to the President.

13. Meeting in Office of Secretary of Defense 30 Jun 1948

(Present were Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Army; Chairman, MLC; Chairman, RDB; Chief, AFSWP; 5 AEC Commissioners)

It was generally understood that the President should decide the issue and that the AEC would present a parallel paper to the President when the Secretary of Defense requests a decision.

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14. Letter to the President from Secretary of Defense 21 Jul 1948
- Letter urges the President to "advise the Atomic Energy Commission that delivery to the Armed Forces of stockpile atomic weapons will be directed, effective approximately four months hence." Incloses letter to Secretary of Defense of 13 March 1948 from Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force and letter from JCS of 20 March 1948, both of which recommend transfer of custody as a matter of urgency.
15. Presidential Refusal 23 Jul 1948
- The President refused to transfer custody of atomic weapons to the Armed Forces despite unanimous recommendations for approval from the three Service Secretaries, the Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Military Liaison Committee.
16. Memorandum to the President from Chairman, AEC 21 Jul 1948
- Advises against transfer of custody.
17. Presidential release to the Press 24 Jul 1948
- "As President of the United States, I regard the continued control of all aspects of the atomic energy program, including research, development and the custody of atomic weapons, as the proper functions of the civil authorities."
18. Letter from the President to Secretary of Defense 6 Aug 1948
- States "On balance, I do not feel justified in exercising my authority under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to order the transfer of the stockpiles to the Armed Services."
19. AEC-AFSWP Agreement on Operation and Maintenance of Storage Sites Able, Baker and Charlie 11 May 1949
- Signed by DoD on 20 April 1949 and by AEC on 11 May 1949. This agreement provided for joint occupancy by the AEC and AFSWP. It stated that AFSWP was primarily concerned with support of operations in the event of national emergency and with support of training exercises and maneuvers. AEC would be responsible for custody of all stockpile items in storage or undergoing inspection. AFSWP would be responsible for custody of AEC weapons released for AFSWP training and maneuvers.

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20. "Report on Future Storage Requirements for Atomic Weapons" 1 Feb 1950

This report, prepared by a working group of a subcommittee of the MLC and approved by the MLC, which was submitted to the JCS for approval recommends that "the Department of Defense should have operational control of the recommended sites, as at the present sites, with present authority extended to include operational control of the nonnuclear components including war reserve kits and spares at the operational sites."

21. Letter from MLC Chairman LeBaron, to Mr. Early 22 Mar 1950
"Surveillance and Custody of Atomic Weapons"

Advises that the AEC is considering a staff study which recommends that the AEC obtain the concurrence of the President to "transfer of custody of stockpile of nonnuclear components of atomic bombs to the Department of Defense" and "delegation of responsibility for routine maintenance of nuclear components of stockpile atomic weapons to the Department of Defense." Such transfer and delegation would not, in the opinion of the AEC, be contrary to the intent of the President's earlier decision that custody of atomic weapons should remain with the AEC.

22. Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from Chairman, 7 Apr 1950
JCS "Surveillance and Custody of Atomic Weapons"

Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the AEC proposal should be supported by the Department of Defense "provided the terms of the proposal are mutually agreed to by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission."

23. Beginning of Korean Conflict early summer 1950

It was decided that bombs, minus nuclear components, would be delivered to the custody of the Air Force and Navy at Operational Storage Sites abroad and aboard carriers. The nuclear components would remain in custody of the AEC in the United States pending further decision in the future.

24. Presidential Letter to the Chairman, AEC 24 Aug 1950

Approved delivery of nonnuclear components from AEC to the Armed Forces for strategic deployment. Delivery was made to the United Kingdom, Guam, [REDACTED] and the carrier [REDACTED]

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25. AEC-MLC Meeting

9 Mar 1951

It was brought out at this meeting that the military had been performing functional surveillance on the entire stockpile, including nuclear components, for some time. AEC expressed surprise at this information. Mr. Dean, AEC, stated that AEC custody was "an empty concept" and that the "real problem" was in establishing the proper division of responsibility for stockpile operations.

26. Joint MLC-AEC Memo to JCS

26 Apr 1951

The MLC approved a jointly agreed upon AEC Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which proposed that nuclear components be transferred to the custody of the DoD in numbers to match the nonnuclear components already deployed. The JCS disapproved this proposal with the statement that it was "untimely." No further explanation was advanced by JCS.

27. AEC-DoD Agreement on "Responsibilities for Stockpile Operations"

3 Aug 1951

28. AEC-AFSWP Agreement Covering the Operation of National Stockpile Sites Under the Command of AFSWP

23 Jun 1952

Implemented terms of the AEC-DoD Agreement on "Responsibilities for Stockpile Operations" of 3 August 1951.

29. Presidential Approval of an NSC Study

10 Sep 1952

The President approved a study compiled by the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the National Security Council. The study was entitled: "Agreed Concepts Regarding Atomic Weapons." It provided:

(1) The Department of Defense should have custody of stocks of atomic weapons outside the continental limits of the U.S. and any such numbers within the continental limits as might be required to assure operational flexibility and military readiness.

(2) The AEC should maintain custody of the remainder of the stockpile.

(3) Other provisions relating to Provisions of Storage Facilities, Physical Security (DoD provided for all storage sites), Access to Weapons, etc.

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30. Assistant Secretary of Defense Memoranda to the Army, Navy, Air Force and AFSWP 16 Oct 1953
Delineated Service custody responsibilities, and responsibilities for operation of "operational sites" overseas and in the United States. The memo to AFSWP charged the Chief, AFSWP with operating a reporting system to insure that he knew the status and location of the stockpile at all times.
31. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, AEC -- Subject: Transfer and Deployment of Atomic Weapons 22 Jun 1953
On recommendation of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, the President, on 20 June 1953, approved the request of the Secretary of Defense to effect the deployment of nuclear components "in numbers equal to the nonnuclear deployments now approved to those storages afloat and ashore wherein the decision to so deploy rests solely with the United States."
32. Presidential Dispersal Authorization to July 1, 1955 1 Dec 1954
The President authorized dispersal of nuclear weapons to include thermonuclear, however he retained approval authority for separate dispersal actions under the plan.
33. AEC-DoD Storage Operations Agreement 3 Aug 1955
Superseded the Joint AEC-DoD Agreement of August 3, 1951.
34. Presidential Dispersal Authorization to July 1, 1956 29 Aug 1955
The President authorized transfer of a certain number of nuclear components to DoD custody. Included were a number of high yield weapons which the DoD was permitted to disperse but for which the AEC would maintain custody.
35. Presidential Letter to AEC 29 Aug 1955
In this letter the President levied the responsibility on AEC to maintain on the spot custody of the high yield weapons at dispersed locations. As a result of this letter, AEC assigned civilian AEC custodians to dispersed locations at home, abroad and aboard ships at sea. The assignment of civilians aboard Naval ships proved impractical and almost immediately, following an AEC briefing of the President, was replaced by use of Naval officers as "Designated Atomic Energy Commission Military Representatives."

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36. Joint AEC-DoD Agreement on Interim Principles and Procedures for the Carrying Out of Responsibilities as directed by the President in Connection with the Early Dispersal of High Yield Weapons 6 Sep 1955

This agreement provided for the maneuver of high yield weapons and specified that such weapons would remain in AEC controlled storage except when being used in readiness exercises of "in other specified instances."

37. AEC Letter to MLC 19 Mar 1956

The letter was in answer to a letter from MLC to AEC. By their letter, AEC agreed to provide space at AEC storage sites for certain DoD weapons. Specifically, the AEC agreed to provide space as listed below:

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38. AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons 4 May 1956

This memorandum provides for the transfer of weapons in AEC custody to DoD custody upon declaration of a Defense Emergency or similar emergency condition.

39. AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons 3 Feb 1960

Superseded the AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding of May 4, 1956.

40. AEC-DoD Agreement as to Principles and Procedures for the Carrying Out of Responsibilities as Directed by the President in Connection with the Dispersal of High Yield Weapons 4 Jun 1956

The agreement implemented the May 4, 1956 AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding.

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41. Presidential Letter to AEC

24 Nov 1956

In his letter, the President directed AEC to maintain custody at DoD locations in the same manner that they were accomplishing the task aboard Naval vessels. This meant that AEC civilian personnel would be withdrawn and military officers would assume the responsibility as DAECMRS. (The DAECMR system was an arrangement whereby the officer acted for both the AEC and DoD in custody matters. Transfer in emergency was effected in the following manner.

(1) The DAECMR held a series of special code words provided to him by joint AEC-AFSWP action.

(2) Commanders authorized to declare a Defense Emergency also held the code words.

(3) When an authorized commander declared a Defense Emergency, his message contained the current code word.

(4) If the code word in the commander's message matched the current word in possession of the DAECMR, he accomplished transfer of custody from AEC to DoD.

Peacetime transfers of weapons required that the DAECMR receive separate authorization to effect transfer of custody from both the DoD and the AEC.)

42. AEC-DoD Agreement for the Dispersal of High Yield Weapons

2 Feb 1957

This agreement implemented the President's direction of 24 November 1956 to the AEC and put the DAECMR system fully in effect for maintenance of dispersed high yield weapons.

43. Amendment to Presidential Dispersal Authorization to July 1, 1956

8 Mar 1956

The President increased the number of low yield weapons authorized for dispersal under DoD custody and established a ceiling on the total number of low and high yields authorized for dispersal.

44. Presidential Dispersal Authorization to July 1, 1957

24 Nov 1956

The President authorized dispersal of nuclear weapons to include thermonuclear. He continued his previous restriction in effect that weapons in excess of 600 KT would remain in the custody of the AEC even when dispersed.

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45. Presidential Atomic Weapons Dispersal Authorization as of July 1, 1958 6 Aug 1957
- The President authorized the dispersal of certain number of nuclear weapons. He established ceilings on the total number of low yield nuclear components under DoD custody and high yield complete weapons under AEC custody authorized for dispersal in the U.S. and overseas.
46. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman, JCS -- Subject: Dispersal Requirements for Atomic Weapons 22 Sep 1958
- Memorandum requests approval of dispersal requirements and DoD custody of all dispersed atomic weapons through 30 June 1959.
47. Letter to the Chairman, AEC from the Acting Secretary of Defense 13 Oct 1958
- In addition to requesting coordination on dispersal requirements through 30 June 1959, it pointed out that a feature of the requested authority would provide for the transfer of all dispersed weapons to the DoD.
48. Letter to the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman, AEC 21 Oct 1958
- The AEC presented specific comments on the proposed letter to the President concerning the subject of DoD custody of all dispersed weapons.
49. Letter to the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 20 Nov 1958
- In addition to requesting dispersals plan as of 1 July 1959, the letter requests authority for the DoD to assume custodial responsibilities for all dispersed weapons including those over 600 KT
50. Annex One to the AEC-DoD Agreement for the Dispersal of High Yield Weapons 26 Nov 1958
- This agreement provided for positioning of U.S. weapons in England for delivery by English vehicles. It provided that the warheads/weapons:
- (1) would remain in U.S. custody.
 - (2) would be provided foreign external security.
- This arrangement served as the basis for future similar dispersals of weapons to other NATO countries.

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51. Presidential Atomic Weapon Dispersal Authorization to July 1959 and Approval of Transfer of Dispersed High Yield Weapons from AEC to DoD 3 Jan 1959
- The President authorized the dispersal of nuclear and nonnuclear components under DoD custody. DoD custody for dispersed high yield weapons was approved based on DoD concluding the necessary arrangements with AEC and notifying the President. This removed the requirement for DAECMR's and they were subsequently withdrawn. Upon implementation, the requirement for AEC custody dwindled to only the NSSs, the OSSs having JCS Reserve weapons, and the AEC facilities.
52. Letter to the President from the Secretary of Defense 12 Feb 1959
- Informs the President that arrangements had been completed for transfer of custody of dispersed weapons to the DoD as requested in the President's letter of 3 January 1959.
53. Presidential Approval of DoD Dispersal Plan to July 1, 1959 26 Feb 1959
- This directive replaced in entirety the President's directive of January 3, 1959. The total numbers of weapons authorized for dispersal as of July 1, 1959 were not changed by the President directed that AEC turn over custody of numbers of atomic weapons and nonnuclear components without regard to high or low yield.
54. Letter to the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 29 Oct 1959
- Requested approval of a program for the dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1960.
55. Presidential Approval of DoD Dispersal Plan as of June 30, 1960 5 Nov 1959
- The President approved the DoD program for the dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1960.
56. Letter to the President from the Secretary of Defense 21 Dec 1960
- Requested approval of a program for the dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1961.
57. Presidential Approval of DoD Dispersal Plan as of June 30, 1961 16 Jan 1961
- The President approved the DoD program for the dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1961.

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58. Memoranda prepared by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) 9 Jun 1960
16 Jun 1960
9 Sep 1960
31 Mar 1961
- They provide OSD studies on custodial measures and arrangements in relation to the questions raised by the JCAE.
59. Letter from the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State to the Chairman, JCAE 28 Jun 1960
- The State Department agreed with DoD regarding arming of allied aircraft with nuclear weapons and permitting weapons to become airborne when an enemy attack was imminent.
60. Report, Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Special Committee on Atomic Energy, United States Congress, 79th Congress, Second Session, Special Report 1211, 1946.
61. Much of the background material on the JCAE was taken from a paper by James T. Ramey, then Executive Director, JCAE, which was prepared for delivery at the 1960 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 8-10, 1960.
62. "Separate Views of Representative Holifield and Representative Price on HR 9759"; House Report 2181 - 83rd Congress, Second Session, Rg 137.
63. House Report 10348, S 3164, 85th Congress, Second Session 1958.
64. Hearings, "Amendments to Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Provide for Greater Exchange of Military Information and Material with Allies," Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Congress, Second Session 1958 at pp 374-385; 387-389; 410-425; 435-444.
65. Record, "Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended" (To Provide for Greater Exchange of Military Information and Material with Allies), Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, House Report 1849, 85th Congress, Second Session 1958, at pp 7-10.
66. Section 144c and 91c(4) restricted cooperation to nations which have "made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons."
67. Statement by Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, February 3, 1960, Joint Committee Press Release No. 243-A.

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68. Congressional Record, 85th Congress, Second Session (Daily Edition), February 9, 1960, page 2169.
69. Study of U.S. and NATO Nuclear Weapons Arrangements, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Ad Hoc Subcommittee) February 11, 1961.
70. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Mr. McGeorge Bundy 3 Mar 1961

It forwarded dispersal information and presented the opinion that there would not be any significant reduction in nuclear weapons stockpile projections without a review of national security policy for use of these weapons.

71. Letter to the President from the Acting Chairman, AEC (Graham) 7 Feb 1961

Presents to the President, the AEC views on custody and control of weapons and long-range requirements for special nuclear materials. Pointed out that at that time, the AEC had custodial responsibility for only about 10% of the stockpile. Stated that the Commission planned to defer action on the dispersal directive of 16 January 1961 until the President had had an opportunity to review the cited issues.

72. Memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense 6 Apr 1961

The Chairman, General Lemnitzer, protested the unilateral AEC action.

73. Meeting, AEC-MLC of March 23, 1961

The Commission indicated that it did not feel that it could separate its concern as to the possible overstocking of weapons for NATO from its overall concern as to the loss of civilian control.

74. Letter to the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 11 Apr 1961

Presents the Department of Defense views on the issues raised in the 7 February 1961 letter from the AEC to the President. Recommended that the President authorize the AEC and the DoD proceed with the dispersal plan of 16 January 1961 with the understanding that no further dispersals for allocations to non-U.S. would be made under that authority.

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75. Letter to the Chairman, AEC from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 11 Apr 1961
- Pointed out the need to implement the dispersal of weapons and stated that he considered it necessary that the question of nuclear support of non-U.S. NATO forces and the remainder of the dispersal program be treated separately.
76. Letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense from the President 20 May 1961
- Authorized "The AEC and the Secretary of Defense to proceed with the dispersal plan of 16 January 1961 as far as U.S. forces were concerned, subject to the desirability of retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites and subject to effective arrangements for modernization of weapons not so retained."
77. Letter to Mr. Owen from the Chairman, AEC 29 May 1961
- Cites possible ambiguity and requests clarification of the terms "National Stockpile Sites" and "substantial reserve" as used in the President's letter of 20 May 1961.
78. Letter to Mr. Bundy from the Chairman, AEC 16 Jun 1961
- Provided data concerning the number of weapons actually in the custody of the AEC and the DoD at that time. In addition, it stated that no additional credits would be authorized pending the requested clarification of terms contained in his 16 June letter to Mr. Bundy.
79. Letter to Mr. Bundy from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 22 Jun 1961
- Presented thoughts concerning possible ambiguities in the President's letter of 20 May 1961 which were raised in Dr. Seaborg's letter to Mr. Owen of 29 May 1961. Stated the belief that the matter of reserve weapons was a basic concept upon which the dispersal program was developed and that the program as approved meets "the desirability of retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites."
80. Letter to the Chairman, AEC from Mr. Bundy 2 Aug 1961
- Stated that any ambiguities which may have existed in the President's letter of 20 May 1961 with respect to the dispersal of nuclear weapons had been clarified by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's letter to Mr. Bundy of 22 June 1961.

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81. Section 3, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law 83-703.
82. Memorandum for the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 16 Mar 1962
Mr. Gilpatrick recommended that DoD be authorized to disperse nuclear weapons under U.S. custody for support of non-U.S. forces. He would withhold [REDACTED] for strike aircraft (except the U.K.) and make clear that NATO strategy is being subject to a complete review.
83. National Security Action Memorandum No. 143 10 Apr 1962
Established procedures for approval of programs of cooperation for nuclear support of non-U.S. forces. Approved support for certain non-U.S. forces.
84. Deputy Chief of Staff Memorandum (DCSM) 1295-62 18 Oct 1962
85. National Security Action Memorandum No. 197 23 Oct 1962
Amended NSAM 143. Programs of cooperation were to be approved under NSAM 197. Specific dispersals were to be approved under NSAM 143.
86. National Security Action Memorandum No. 199 25 Oct 1962
Amended portions of NSAM 197 to permit the loading of [REDACTED] or less on NATO QRA aircraft.
87. Deputy Joint Staff Memorandum DJSM-1395-62 5 Nov 1962
The JCS expressed concern that immediate approval of the FY62 dispersal plan was needed to alleviate a shortage of dispersal credits.
88. Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Mr. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, subject: Additional Dispersals in Support of U.S. forces 9 Dec 1962
Requested ISA to review the proposed FY 62 dispersal plan.
89. Letter to Mr. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense from the President 26 Dec 1962
Disapproved the proposed FY 62 dispersal plan. Dispersals were to be made under the FY 61 and FY 62 authorizations.

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90. Memorandum for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: FY 1962 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan 27 Feb 1963

The JCS could disperse [REDACTED] additional weapons to areas under full U.S. control. (b)(1) (b)(3)

91. Letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 13 Nov 1963

State concurred in the proposed FY 63 dispersal plan subject to State review of dispersals above those authorized in NSAM 143.

92. Letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 5 Mar 1964

State concurred in the proposed FY 64 dispersal plan subject to the same reservations expressed in their letter of 13 November 1963.

93. Memorandum to the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, subject: Request for Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 64 26 Mar 1964

DoD submitted the proposed FY 64 dispersal plan to the President.

94. National Security Action Memorandum No. 305 16 Jun 1964

The President approved the DoD proposed Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 64.

95. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State 3 Dec 1963

DoD forwarded to State for comment the JCS paper subject: Military Strategy for NATO, December 1963.

96. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense 20 Feb 1964

State Department paper, U.S. Policies for NATO Defense sent to DoD.

97. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State May 1964

Mr. McNamara solicited comments from State on a proposed plan for support of non-U.S. forces.

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98. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense 28 Jul 1964
Mr. Rusk stated that State and DoD should conduct a joint study of NATO tactical nuclear warfare.
99. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State 19 Jun 1964
Mr. McNamara suggested using MC 100/1 as guidance for our NATO representatives.
100. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense 13 Aug 1964
Mr. Rusk suggested deferring attempts to reach an agreement on MC 100/1.
101. Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM) The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy Oct 1964
Expressed Mr. McNamara's personal views on NATO Tactical Nuclear Strategy.
102. National Security Action Memorandum No. 332 Dec 1964
Stated the official national nuclear policy for Europe.
103. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (JCSM 694-64) for the Secretary of Defense 17 Aug 1964
Forwarded the proposed JCS dispersal plan for FY 65.
104. Letter from the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State, Llewellyn E. Thompson to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), Mr. William J. Howard 20 Nov 1964
State did not concur in the dispersals for non-U.S. NATO forces.
105. Letter from the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cyrus Vance 17 May 1965
State concurred in the revised FY 65 dispersal plan.
106. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State 24 May 1965
Mr. McNamara notified Mr. Rusk that no additional ADMs would be shipped to Europe.

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107. Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Defense, subject: Request for Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1965/1966 24 May 1965
- Forwarded the proposed FY 65 dispersal plan to the President.
108. Letter from the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of Defense 20 May 1965
- AEC concurred in the FY 65 dispersal plan.
109. National Security Action Memorandum No. 334 1 Jun 1965
- The President approved the FY 65 nuclear weapons dispersal plan.
110. White House Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: Change in the Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1966 18 Dec 1966
- The President approved the increase of [redacted] strategic nuclear bombs in Guam.
111. Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) 18 Nov 1965
- State concurred in the increase [on Guam.]
112. Letter from the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of Defense 22 Nov 1965
- AEC concurred in the increase [on Guam.]
113. Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the Secretary of Defense 11 Jul 1966
- Dr. Seaborg proposed to recommend to the President that AEC transfer custody of all finished weapons to DoD.
114. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC 3 Aug 1966
- Mr. Vance concurred in Dr. Seaborg's proposal but believed it advisable to withhold the letter to the President pending completion of a joint revision of existing applicable stockpile agreements.

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115. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC 8 Nov 1966

Mr. Vance sent a redraft of Dr. Seaborg's letter to the President and proposed NSAM to Dr. Seaborg which indicated Mr. Vance's readiness to proceed with the transfer if AEC would concur in the terms of the proposed Stockpile Agreement.

116. Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 23 Dec 1966

Dr. Seaborg forwarded a redraft of the Stockpile Agreement to Mr. Vance.

117. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC 10 Jan 1967

Mr. Vance agreed to the drafts of the letter to the President and the NSAM.

118. Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the President 30 Jan 1967

Dr. Seaborg sent the jointly agreed DoD-AEC letter to the President and draft NSAM proposing the transfer of all finished weapons to DoD custody.

119. Letter from the President to the Chairman, AEC 10 Feb 1967

The President, pursuant to Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, directed the AEC to deliver such weapons and components to the Department of Defense at locations, times and in accordance with such procedures that may mutually be agreed to between the AEC and DoD.

120. Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 10 Mar 1967

Dr. Seaborg signed the Stockpile Agreement for AEC and forwarded it to Mr. Vance for signature.

121. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC 20 Mar 1967

Mr. Vance signed the Stockpile Agreement and sent one copy back to Dr. Seaborg. He also agreed to inform the President annually of weapon transfers in the annual stockpile plan as requested by the President in his letter to Dr. Seaborg of February 10, 1967.

122. Memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense 10 Sep 1966

The Chairman forwarded the proposed FY 67 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Program.

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123. Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 27 Sep 1966
- Replied to the proposed FY 67 Dispersal Program and stated that the ceiling of [redacted] weapons for NATO Europe in NSAM 334 remains in effect. (b)(3)
124. JCSM-52-66, subject: Programs of Cooperation (Nuclear Weapons) 24 Jan 1966
125. JCSM-287-66, subject: The NATO Force Planning Exercise 1967-1971 5 May 1966
126. Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 27 Sep 1966
- The decision on the dispersal of nuclear weapons to NATO Europe remains as stated in NSAM 334.
127. Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) to Mr. Vance, subject: Consideration of Nonconcurrence in the Proposed FY 67 Dispersal Plan by ASD(ISA) and ASD(SA) 10 Nov 1966
- Dr. Walske recommended Mr. Vance approve the plan as written.
128. Letter from Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State to Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense 18 Apr 1967
- State concurred in the proposed FY 67 dispersal plan.
129. Letter from the Acting Chairman, AEC to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 10 May 1967
- AEC concurred in the FY 67 dispersal plan but recommended a few changes.
130. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC 26 May 1967
- Forwarded the FY 67 plan modified to include FY 68 which included all the changes except one recommended by AEC.
131. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Deputy Under Secretary of State 26 May 1967
- Forwarded the FY 67 plan modified to include FY 68.

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132. Memorandum for the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: Request for Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1967 and FY 1968
133. NSAM 364, subject: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1967-FY 1968 14 Aug 1967
134. Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) to All Holders of the Proposed FY 67-68 Dispersal Plan 5 Jul 1967

Requested holders to correct the proposed FY 67-68 Dispersal Plan.

135. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 19 Aug 1967

Mr. Nitze forwarded NSAM 364 to the JCS and notified them that the ceilings of [redacted] and [redacted] for NATO Europe would not be exceeded. (b)

136. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 26 Jan 1968

Mr. Nitze imposed a temporary ceiling of [redacted] weapons in NATO Europe and intended to hold the number of weapons in [redacted] and afloat in the Atlantic and Pacific at the level actually dispersed as of December 31, 1967. (b)

137. JCSM-160-68, subject: Deployment of Mk 25 (GENIE) Warheads to [redacted] 15 Mar 1968

The JCS requested increases in the weapons ceilings for [redacted] in order to disperse GENIE rockets to those areas. (b)

138. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Apr 1968

Mr. Nitze refused to increase his ceilings on weapons in [redacted]. (b)

139. Memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 29 Mar 1968

The JCS requested an increase in Mr. Nitze's ceiling on weapons afloat in the Atlantic from [redacted] to [redacted]. (b)(3)

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140. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 6 Apr 1968

Mr. Nitze increased his ceiling on weapons afloat in the Atlantic from [redacted] to [redacted]

141. JCSM-142-68 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 8 Mar 1968

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment of nuclear weapon deployments to Europe for the period 1 January-30 June 1968.

142. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SA) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 14 Mar 1968

Systems Analysis forwarded their analysis of requirements for deploying nuclear weapons to Europe in FY 68-70.

143. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 5 Apr 1968

Mr. Nitze requested JCS comments on the Systems Analysis assessment.

144. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 9 Apr 1968

Mr. Nitze requested a reappraisal of nuclear weapons [redacted] ceiling for NATO Europe with the objective of assessing the relative priorities of dispersals toward reducing them to a level of [redacted]

145. JCSM-260-68 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 25 Apr 1968

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the Systems Analysis paper and provided their comments.

146. Memorandum from ASD(ISA) and ATSD(AE) to the Secretary of Defense 24 Apr 1968

Proposed querying JCS on the desirability of realigning distribution of nuclear weapons [redacted] and on Guam and [redacted] in approximately equal numbers.

147. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 4 May 1968

Mr. Clifford requested the view of the JCS on a proposed redistribution of weapons in approximately equal numbers on Guam [redacted]

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148. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 12 Apr 1968

Directed the JCS to install PAL devices on all weapons now deployed or planned for deployment at advance [REDACTED] (S)(1)

149. JCSM-392-68 to the Secretary of Defense 25 Jun 1968

The JCS recommended no change in the current distribution of tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific.

150. Covering Brief from ATSD(AE) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 29 Dec 1967

151. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs 29 Dec 1967

Forwarded the proposed FY 69 NWDCP for concurrence.

152. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC 29 Dec 1967

Forwarded the proposed FY 69 NWDCP for concurrence.

153. Letter from the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of Defense 26 Feb 1968

AEC concurred in the proposed NWDCP for FY 1969 subject to recommended minor changes.

154. Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 6 Mar 1968

State concurred in the proposed FY 1969 NWDCP.

155. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 9 Mar 1969

Forwarded the proposed FY 69 NWDCP for approval.

156. Memorandum from ATSD(AE) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 23 May 1968

Gave the background on OSD/White House discussions on the proposed FY 69 NWDCP.

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157. NSAM 370, Nuclear Weapon Deployment Authorization for FY 1969 and FY 1970 11 Jun 1968
158. Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 22 Jul 1968
159. Joint Chiefs of Staff Request for Increased Afloat Deployment Authorization for PACOM 14 Jun 1968
- Joint Chiefs of Staff requested an increase in CINCPAC nuclear weapons afloat from [redacted] to [redacted] (b)(3)
160. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 25 Jun 1968
- Mr. Nitze notified General Wheeler of the new ceiling for weapons afloat.
161. Covering Brief from ATSD(AE) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 21 Jun 1968
- Dr. Walske recommended, with concurrence from Drs. Halperin (ISA) and Selin (SA), a new ceiling for weapons afloat of [redacted] weapons (b)(3)
162. JCSM-395-68 to the Secretary of Defense 26 Jun 1968
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to Mr. Nitze's memorandum of April 9. They opposed any reduction in NATO Europe and recommended that the nuclear weapon deployment ceiling be maintained at the level of [redacted] as authorized by the President in NSAMs 334 and 364. (b)(3)
163. JCSM-426-68 to the Secretary of Defense 5 Jul 1968
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested reconsideration of Mr. Nitze's decision of April 1 not to permit an increase in his ceiling on weapons. [redacted] They requested an increase of [redacted] weapons to permit the introduction of GENIE rockets for the [redacted] (b)(3)
164. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 6 Aug 1968
- Mr. Nitze gave guidance to the JCS for implementation of NSAM 370 and established revised OSD ceilings on dispersals.
165. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to CJCS, ASD(ISA), ASD(SA) and ATSD(AE) 6 Sep 1968
- Requested a list of unresolved issues for the forthcoming stockpile and deployment plans.

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166. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 24 Sep 1968
Gave the JCS additional guidance for the forthcoming deployment plan.
167. CM-3688-68 to the Secretary of Defense 1 Oct 1969
General Wheeler listed the unresolved issues.
168. JCSM-630-68 to the Secretary of Defense 24 Oct 1968
Forwarded the JCS proposed NWDCP for FY 70.
169. Memorandum from ATSD(AE) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 24 Oct 1968
Summarized the FY 70 deployment issues and made recommendations to Mr. Nitze that his ceilings and guidelines be maintained.
170. CM-3757-68 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 7 Nov 1968
General Wheeler agreed to the stockpile and deployment levels with certain exceptions.
171. Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the ATSD(AE) 16 Dec 1968
Dr. Seaborg concurred in the plan.
172. Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to ATSD(AE) 10 Dec 1968
State concurred in the plan.
173. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 20 Dec 1968
Forwarded the FY 1970 NWDCP for approval.
174. NSAM 372, subject: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1970 and FY 1971 18 Jan 1969
175. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 25 Jan 1969
Mr. Laird forwarded NSAM 372 to the CJCS with a statement that he intended to review it in the future.

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176. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the ATSD(AE) 25 Jan 1969
- Mr. Laird kept Mr. Nitze's ceilings in effect.
177. Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 29 Dec 1961
- Mr. Gilpatrick approved the deployment of Nike Hercules warheads to ARNG SAM sites, provided custody will be with members of the U.S. Armed Forces on active duty.
178. Letter from the President to the Secretary of Defense 12 Mar 1965
- The President approved the Secretary of Defense's memorandum of July 18, 1964, which requested approval for release of nuclear weapons to National Guard Air Defense Units in emergencies. The JCS had requested this in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense of March 5, 1964.
179. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 22 Mar 1965
- Mr. Vance gave the JCS approval for the deployment authorized by the President.
180. Public Law 90-486, subject: National Guard Technicians Act of 1968, enacted on August 13, 1968, and effective on January 1, 1969.
- National Guard technicians employed under the act are employees of the United States.
181. JCSM 105-69 to the Secretary of Defense 24 Feb 1969
- The JCS recommended approval of the transfer of custody of nuclear weapons to ARNG Technicians at ARNG Nike Hercules sites.
182. Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 9 Jun 1965
- Mr. Vance deferred shipment of additional ADMs to Europe.
183. JCSM-470-69 to the Secretary of Defense 31 Jul 1969
- The JCS requested approval of an ADM Program of Cooperation.

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184. Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 4 Sep 1969
Mr. Packard deferred a decision on the ADM Program of Cooperation.
185. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ATSD(AE) 5 Nov 1969
Mr. Packard authorized going to State and AEC with the ADM Program of Cooperation.
186. Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense from F. M. Bator, Special Assistant to the President 30 Aug 1966
The President approved a 155mm warhead Program of Cooperation.
187. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 16 Jul 1969
Requested additional information on the Army National Guard proposal to transfer custody of Nike Hercules units.
188. JCSM-676-69 to the Secretary of Defense 29 Oct 1969
Forwarded the JCS NWDCP-FY 71.
189. Memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense from W. W. Rostow 8 Jul 1966
The President approved a Lance Program of Cooperation.
190. Memorandum to the Secretary of the Army from the Secretary of Defense 15 Dec 1967
Mr. McNamara directed Mr. Resor to reorient the Lance development.
191. Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 11 Jan 1969
Mr. Nitze asked General Wheeler to determine if we should go ahead with a new Lance Program of Cooperation.
192. JCSM-677-69 to the Secretary of Defense 29 Oct 1969
The JCS requested approval of a Lance Program of Cooperation.

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193. MJCS-500-69 to the Secretary of Defense 23 Oct 1969
Responded to and provided the additional data to support the ARNG transfer proposal.
194. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President 20 Jan 1970
Requested approval of the ARNG transfer proposal.
195. Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense 20 Feb 1970
Notified SecDef of Presidential approval of the ARNG transfer proposal.
196. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 2 Mar 1970
Notified JCS of the Presidential approval of the ARNG custody transfer and gave authority and guidance on implementation.
197. JCSM-287-70 to the Secretary of Defense 12 Jun 1970
JCS requested transfer of control of nuclear weapons in F-101 units to Air National Guard technicians.
198. NSDM 59 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 9 May 1970
Approved the FY 1971-1972 nuclear weapons stockpile.
199. NSDM 60 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 9 May 1970
Approved the FY71 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization Plan.
200. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 20 Nov 1970
Delegated authority to the JCS to increase approved deployment levels in NATO Europe and other deployment increases in any theater up to 10%.
201. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 22 Dec 1970
Disapproved the ANG proposed transfer program indicating manpower and monetary savings were not substantial enough to warrant Presidential approval.

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202. NSDM 121 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 21 Jul 1971
Approved the FY 1972 nuclear weapons deployment authorization.
203. NSDM 128 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 16 Aug 1971
Approved the FY 1972-1974 nuclear weapons stockpile.
204. JCSM-535-71 to the Secretary of Defense 7 Dec 1971
Resubmitted the ANG transfer proposal with additional information and justification.
205. Memorandum from Secretary Laird to Sec AF and Chairman, JCS 27 Mar 1972
Issuance of guidance concerning future actions regarding nuclear operations [REDACTED]
206. Memorandum from Secretary Laird to the President 31 Mar 1972
Notification of completion of nuclear posture review of [REDACTED] and directions he had given to alleviate some potential problem areas. (b)(1)
207. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 9 May 1972
Transmitted the Presidentially requested war plans study in accordance with the parameters of NSDMs 121 and 128.
208. NSDM 174 Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 7 Jul 1972
Approved the FY 1973-1975 nuclear weapons stockpile.
209. NSDM 178, Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 18 Jul 1972
Approved the FY 1973 nuclear weapons deployment authorization.
210. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President 13 Sep 1972
Recommend Presidential approval to transfer custody of F-101/F-106 weapons units to the Air National Guard.

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211. Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense 24 Oct 1972
Notified SecDef of Presidential approval of the transfer of custody to the Air National Guard.
212. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 1 Nov 1972
Notified JCS of Presidential approval of the ANG proposal and gave authority and guidance on implementation.
213. Joint State/Defense Memorandum to the President late Nov 1972
Forwarding a study summarizing the political and military impact of removal of nuclear weapons [REDACTED] (b)(1)
214. JCSM-43-73 to the Secretary of Defense 2 Feb 1973
Submission of the proposed FY 1974 nuclear weapons deployment plan.
215. Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense 7 Feb 1973
Approval of FY aircraft [REDACTED] and request for contemplated timing of the return. (b)(1)
216. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Dr. Kissinger 16 May 1973
Informed that F-4s were still committed to SEA, that SIOP alert [REDACTED] remained valid and would be advised when aircraft become available to resume SIOP. (b)(1)
217. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 8 Jun 1973
Requesting approval of the FY74 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan.
218. NSDM 226 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 18 Jul 1973
Approved the FY 1974 nuclear weapons deployment authorization.

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219. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 28 Jul 1973
Notifying of Presidential approval of the FY 1974 deployment plan.
220. NSDM 228 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 8 Aug 1973
Approved the FY 1974-1976 nuclear weapons stockpile.
221. JCSM-377-73 to the Secretary of Defense 24 Aug 1973
Requested authority to deploy [redacted] ASW weapons [redacted] due to site security problems. (b) (1)
222. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 27 Sep 1973
Approved the deployment of [redacted] ASW weapons [redacted] (b) (1)
223. Letter from Secretary Schlesinger to Senator Pastore, Vice Chairman, JCAE 3 Nov 1973
Answers questions concerning storage at [redacted] (b) (1)
224. NSDM 258 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 20 Jun 1974
Approved yield change for non-US NATO forces to [redacted] for the B61-2/B61-3 weapon. D.L.
225. NSDM 259 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 20 Jun 1974
Approved a program of cooperation for nuclear bomb support of non-US NATO nations for the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) and added the B61-2/B61-3 bombs to previously approved programs of cooperation.
226. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 27 Aug 1974
Requesting approval of the FY 1975 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan.

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227. JCSM-404-74 to the Secretary of Defense 7 Oct 1974
Reporting on their reexamination of the [REDACTED] storage problem.
228. NSDM 274 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 8 Oct 1974
Approved the FY75 nuclear weapons deployment authorization.
229. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 16 Apr 1975
Requesting approval of the FY 1976 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan.
230. Memorandum from General Scowcroft to General Wickham 30 Apr 1975
Informing Defense that the President directed that there would be no withdrawal of US forces or nuclear weapons overseas areas without his expressed approval.
231. Memorandum from General Scowcroft to General Wickham 23 May 1975
The President approved verbal request to remove [REDACTED] older theater nuclear weapons from Guam for retirement. (b)(1)
232. Report, WASH-1212, A History of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile (U) FY 1945-FY 1972 and the FY 1973 Supplement dated 1 July 1974, published by the Division of Military Application, U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration 22 Feb 1973
233. Report, to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93-365, entitled: "The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe," published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and available from the Defense Documentation Center, Alexandria, Virginia 22314. April 1975
234. Memorandum from General Scowcroft to the Secretary of Defense 30 Jun 1975
Informed SecDef that the President had authorized continuation of the FY 75 deployments pending his decision on the FY 76 plan.

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235. NSDM 300 from the President to the Secretaries of State and Defense 16 Jul 1975
Approved the FY 1976-1977 nuclear weapons deployment plan; withheld approval of the SACEUR Reserve concept; requested rationale for proposed reductions and requested revised deployment tables reflecting decisions in this NSDM.
236. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President 1 Aug 1975
Forwarded rationale and revised deployment tables that were requested in NSDM 300.
237. JCSM-422-75 to the Secretary of Defense 4 Dec 1975
Submitted the proposed FY 1977-1978 Nuclear Weapon Deployment Plan.
238. Report, "Improving the Effectiveness of NATO's Theater Nuclear Forces (U)" 19 Dec 1975
239. Memorandum from ATSD(AE) to the Director, Joint Staff 16 Dec 1975
Authorized removal of remaining Honest John warheads [REDACTED] (b)(1)
240. JCSM-20-76 to the Secretary of Defense 19 Jan 1976
Submitted site-by-site review study and recommendations for site consolidations and closures.
241. Memorandum from General Scowcroft to the Secretary of Defense 27 Jan 1976
Transmitted Presidential approval of an additional [REDACTED] Poseidon reentry vehicles for [REDACTED] (b)(3)
242. JCSM-127-76 to the Secretary of Defense 5 Apr 1976
Requested Presidential approval be sought to remove all ASW weapons from [REDACTED]
243. NSDM 328 from General Scowcroft to the Secretaries of State and Defense 4 May 1976
Provided notification that the President had approved a modification of SSBN commitments to NATO.

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244. Memorandum from the President's National Security Advisor to the National Security Council Defense Review Panel 25 May 1976
Recommended the FY 1977-1978 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan be forwarded to the President without an NSC meeting.
245. Memorandum from the Deputy ATSD(AE) to the Director, Joint Staff 7 Jun 1976
Authorized the removal of all ASW weapons [REDACTED] (b) (1)
246. NSDM 332 from the President's National Security Advisor to the Secretaries of State and Defense 7 Jul 1976
Approved the FY 1977-1978 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan.
247. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 21 Jul 1976
Directed an early effort to withdraw [REDACTED] weapons from [REDACTED] (b) (1)
248. Letter from the Deputy ATSD(AE) to Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State Department 1 Oct 1976
Requested concurrence in removing weapons from [REDACTED] (b) (1)
249. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 10 Nov 1976
Concurred in [closing 23 storage sites] and recommended in JCSM-20-76 and provided additional guidance. (b) (3)
250. Memorandum from the President's National Security Advisor to the Secretary of Defense 18 Dec 1976
Advised that the President had decided to delay withdrawal of the Sergeant Missile Battalion [REDACTED] until further notice. (b) (1)
251. ATSD(AE) Memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff 3 Jan 1977
Provided notification of Presidential decision to delay withdrawal of the Sergeant [warheads] [REDACTED] (b) (1)
252. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to General Haig 17 Jan 1977
Suggested delay in closing seven Central Region sites, requested examination of the entire site consolidation issue and agreed to delay site discussions with [REDACTED] (b) (1)

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253. Memorandum from the Deputy ATSD(AE) to the Director, Joint Staff 17 Feb 1977

Forwarded State Department concurrence in withdrawing remaining nuclear weapons from [REDACTED]

b

254. Letter from General Haig to the Secretary of Defense 25 Feb 1977

Acknowledged the 17 Jan SecDef letter, informed the SecDef that terms of reference and development of US position on site assessment was underway and, as a follow-on, if opportune, open discussions separately with [REDACTED]

(b) (1)

255. DJSM-409-77 to the ATSD(AE) 1 Mar 1977

Provided notification that a MAC airlift mission had been scheduled for 7 March and requested that State be so informed.

256. Deputy ATSD(AE) Letter to the Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State 1 Mar 1977

Requesting State concurrence to change the FY 1977 deployment authorization for B61 bombs in support of allied squadrons in Europe.

257. Deputy ATSD(AE) Memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff 4 Mar 1977

Requested cancellation of 7 March schedule of weapons removal from [REDACTED] due to political concerns expressed by State Department.

258. Letter from Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs to the ATSD(AE) 4 Mar 1977

Provided State concurrence in change to the FY 1977 deployment authorization.

259. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 18 Mar 1977

Requesting approval of a change to the FY 1977 Deployment Authorization delaying removal of B61 bombs from [REDACTED]

(b) (1)

260. Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 26 Mar 1977

Providing notification that removal of [REDACTED] bombs from [REDACTED] would be delayed due to State desiring a deferment pending Congressional debate on the [REDACTED]

(b) (1)

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261. Memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of Defense 31 Mar 1977
Approved the FY 1977-1978 deployment plan change concerning B61 bombs in Europe.
262. Memorandum from the Deputy ATSD(AE) to the Director, Joint Staff 14 Apr 1977
Provided notification that State concurred again with removal from [redacted] requested initiation to remove the weapons, and that OATSD(AE) be informed when withdrawal was complete.
263. Deputy ATSD(AE) Memorandum to Director, Joint Staff 20 Apr 1977
Forwarded approval in FY 1977-1978 deployment authorization change concerning B61 bombs in Europe.
264. DJSM-769-77 to the ATSD(AE) 26 Apr 1977
Provided notification that all nuclear weapons were removed from [redacted] by airlift on 23 April 1977. (b)(1)
265. Deputy ATSD(AE) Letter to Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, State Department 27 Apr 1977
Confirmed removal of all nuclear weapons from [redacted] on 23 April 1977. (b)(1)
266. CM-1524-77 to the Secretary of Defense 14 Jul 1977
Requested Secretary of Defense approval to withdraw [redacted] tactical bombs from [redacted]. (b)(1)
267. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 27 Jul 1977
Approved withdrawal of [redacted] tactical bombs [redacted] after July 26, 1977. (b)(1)
268. CM-1585-77 to the Secretary of Defense 22 Aug 77
Requested Secretary of Defense approval to withdraw [redacted] ground force nuclear weapons [redacted] during October-December 1977. (Approved 23 August 1977) (b)(1)
269. ATSD(AE) Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense 9 Sep 1977
Forwarded the proposed FY 1977-1978 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan for approval.

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270. DJSM-1550-77 to the ATSD(AE)

9 Sep 1977

Provided notification of [REDACTED] collocation, complimentary weapons movement, and reduction of [REDACTED] sites from 11 to 10.

271. ATSD(AE) Letter to Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State Department 14 Sep 1977

Forwarded FY 1978-1979 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization Plan for departmental concurrence.

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